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FARAH PETERSON

Expounding the Constitution
abstrac t. Judges and statesmen of the early Republic had heated exchanges over the im-

portance of hewing to the text in constitutional interpretation, and they advanced dueling interpretive prescriptions. That is why contemporary theorists of all persuasions can ﬁnd support for
their positions in the Founding era. But no side of the Founders’ debate over constitutional interpretation maps perfectly onto a modern school of thought. Modern scholarship has misunderstood the terms of the Founders’ debate because it sits on an unfamiliar axis. Instead of arguing
over whether the Constitution was, for instance, living or static, this Article demonstrates that
early American lawyers debated whether the Constitution should be interpreted according to the
methodologies applicable to public or private legislation.
This distinction among different types of legislation has faded from view because modern
legislatures almost never pass private laws—statutes that apply only to one person, group, or
corporation. But in early America, private legislation was the majority of legislatures’ business.
Generally applicable laws, like those Congress busies itself with today, were the minority. What’s
more, American courts had ﬁxed, predictable, and familiar rules of interpretation for each type of
law. Private acts received stricter, more text-oriented interpretations, while public acts were interpreted broadly and pragmatically to effectuate their purposes, taking into account new circumstances that the drafters may not have foreseen.
After ratiﬁcation, critical policy differences emerged among American statesmen in the First
Congress. Hamilton and Madison, once united as authors of the Federalist Papers, found themselves on different sides of this debate. Each insisted that the Constitution must be interpreted to
vindicate his views, and in the process, they opened a debate about interpretation that would
characterize the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence until the 1820s. The Federal Constitution
was a novelty. But lawyers don’t tend to make new rules to suit new situations; we prefer to rely
on precedent. And that is what these lawyers did, using legal tools devised for interpreting legislation—a form of written law with consistent interpretive rules that were part of the bread-andbutter practice of every American lawyer.
We cannot understand the major cases of the Marshall Court, including Marbury, Martin,
and McCulloch without this context. In these cases, litigants argued over, and the Court wrestled
with, whether public or private legislation provided the best analogy for the Federal Constitution. The answer dictated whether restrictive or pragmatic rules would govern its interpretation.
The terms of these arguments would have been obvious to the legal thinkers of that generation.
Yet, in spite of all the attention we have lavished on Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, John Marshall, Joseph Story, and their world, this central dynamic of their legal
culture has remained unexplored.

2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722302

the claims of official reason

This Article argues that, during framing and ratiﬁcation, many of the Founders thought the
Constitution would be interpreted according to the rules applicable to public legislation, although statesmen like Jefferson and Madison later took a different view. Chief Justice Marshall’s
enduring commitment to the public-act analogy explains his embrace of “implied powers” in
McCulloch and underpins the broad, nationalist vision in his other major decisions. These insights are not only critical to understanding those decisions on their own terms, they are also
highly relevant to modern constitutional theorists who rely on early American precedent. If the
Founders intended that the Constitution would be interpreted according to the rules of public
legislation, then the “original” Constitution is a ﬂexible and pragmatic charter, not a ﬁxed and
immutable artifact.
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introduction
Every modern school of constitutional interpretation delights in ﬁnding
precedent for its method in the Founding era and in the jurisprudence of Chief
Justice Marshall. Of course, originalists make history central and have cited the
Founders as support for a range of opinions on interpretation. 1 But those opposed to originalism also ﬁnd precedent for their positions in early America.2
Both states’ rights advocates and those who believe in strong federal government have relied on history for support. 3 This habit of relying on texts from
the Founding generation to validate modern views has led to signiﬁcant historical oversights, however. It has made history’s important legal thinkers appear
shallow, unsophisticated, and intellectually disorganized, if not incoherent. Today’s scholarship makes Chief Justice Marshall at once a modern textualist—
that is, a jurist who believes in reading text strictly and literally—and a modern
purposivist—that is, a jurist who believes in pragmatic interpretation to accomplish a law’s purposes.
This Article begins from the premise that we have failed to take full account
of the Founding era as a period with a mature and developed legal system of its
own—one with interpretive debates and schools of thought unique to that era.
The Article then argues that considering early Americans and their methodological debates on their own terms, rather than as progenitors of today’s interpretive schools, yields a key and overlooked insight: the centrality of the distinction between interpretive conventions applicable to public and private laws.
Judges and statesmen of the early Republic had heated exchanges over the
importance of hewing to the text in constitutional interpretation, and they advanced dueling interpretive prescriptions. But in spite of all of the attention we

1.

2.

3.

See, e.g., John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1651 (2001) (reasserting a “historical claim that the best
reading of the constitutional structure supports the . . . faithful agent theory” of interpretation—that is, textualism).
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1089, 1092-93 (1997) (arguing that McCulloch v. Maryland is “the quintessential example of penumbral reasoning”); William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 983, 1006 (2009) (“[T]he Founding generation . . . looked beyond text to determine
constitutional meaning.”).
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (looking to the Founding era to support a limited-powers, compact-theory view of the
Federal Constitution); cf. Sanford Levinson, Preface to the Sixth Edition, in ROBERT G.
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT, at ix, x (Sanford Levinson ed., rev. 6th ed.
2016) (describing the author’s view that, in pushing for the New Deal, “Roosevelt simply
wanted to return to Marshall’s broad and capacious nationalist vision”).
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have lavished on Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, Story, and their
world, this central interpretive debate has remained unexplored. Modern
scholarship has misunderstood the terms of the Founders’ debate because it sits
on an unfamiliar axis. Instead of arguing over whether the Constitution was,
for instance, living or static, these early American conversations were part of a
decades-long debate over which of two preexisting, well-established paradigms
of interpretation was most appropriate for the new Constitution. Without this
context, we cannot understand some of the most important and most cited
constitutional law precedents from this period. And of course, the Founders’
own debate about whether the Constitution should be pragmatically or narrowly construed is highly relevant to any contemporary theorist relying on
Founding-era views.
The clearest examples of the two methodologies the Founders saw as their
options for how the Constitution should be interpreted can be found in the
different rules then applicable to the interpretation of private and public legislation. Although this distinction has now largely fallen by the wayside, federal
and state legislatures in the age of Jefferson and Marshall engaged in two
different kinds of legislative work. Some of that work involved what they
would have called public acts. These were the kinds of laws that make up the
bulk of what our legislatures pass today: statutes that enact generally applicable
rules. Public acts addressed social ills, set standards for industry, regulated behavior, pursued remedial policies, or committed resources to public projects. 4
The legislative process for such acts was much like the process that we know
today: a member might propose a measure, which the assembly would debate
before referring it to a special committee that would draft proposed language.
After further debate and perhaps an opportunity to consult with constituents
or experts, the legislature would pass some version of the bill into law. 5
But public acts were the exception in early American legislation. As Chief
Justice Smith of New Hampshire put it in 1806, the number of statutes “which
prescribe rules of civil conduct to the citizens, rules for making and expounding contracts, principles of decision on the questions daily agitated in our
4.

See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 1-2 (1996). Novak writes against the idea that early American governments were laissez-faire, setting out in great detail the range of issues about which there existed pervasive and granular regulation at the state and especially the city level. These types
of rules and regulations, in which the government responds to concerns of a public nature,
would have all been designated “public” acts.

5.

See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT
OF 1789, at 13, 14-15 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992) (discussing the process Congress pursued
while crafting the ﬁrst Judiciary Act, including sending drafts to experts in senators’ states).
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courts of justice,” was quite “small.” 6 Instead, much of the legislative business
in Congress and state legislatures of the period was devoted to so-called private
acts—also called private bills or private legislation—which ﬁxed or determined
the legal rights of particular parties. In fact, it was not unusual for the number
of private acts to vastly outstrip the number of public acts in a given statelegislative session. 7
The central characteristic of private bills was their speciﬁc character—they
determined the legal rights of particular parties in response to particular requests, rather than enacting rules of general applicability. 8 While public acts
changed the laws applicable to everybody, private acts usually addressed more
targeted concerns. Individuals or groups might petition asking for a special favor—an exemption from some generally applicable law, spot relief for a temporary problem, or the grant of a parcel of state-owned land. The award of a corporate charter or a divorce, for example, would have been granted in an
individually debated private act. 9 Many private acts resolved issues that would
6.

Jeremiah Smith, Book Review, MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY & BOS. REV., Mar. 1806, at 138, 138,
quoted in JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL
NEW HAMPSHIRE 160 (2004).

7.

See, e.g., Contents, 1813 N.C. Sess. Laws 42 (listing nineteen public laws and ninety-ﬁve private laws enacted). Legislatures still pass a very limited number of private laws today. In
Congress, however, this amounts to only one or two per year. See, e.g., Private Laws: 111th
Congress, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/private-laws/111th-congress [https://
perma.cc/P8EV-SAKY].
In some states, published statute books indicated with labels or separate placement in the
volume which bills were public and which were private. But legislation was not always so
designated, for reasons ranging from impoverished record-keeping practices to the simple
belief that the content of the legislation disclosed for itself whether it was a public or private
act. Moreover, the status of some legislation was contested. Much more historical work remains to be done on those fascinating borderline cases, which involved, in some states, important corporations and banks. For that matter, historians of the city have noted a transformation over time in the way cities and towns were considered, from private to public, and
this transformation is also likely reﬂected in the methods judges applied when interpreting
cities’ incorporating legislation. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 179-239
(1983); Gerald E. Frug, Property and Power: Hartog on the Legal History of New York City, 1984
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 673, 677 (reviewing HARTOG, supra). What matters for purposes of
this Article is that the thinkers I discuss understood the general distinction between public
and private legislation and the statutory canons of construction that were applied to the typical bills in each category.
See, e.g., Act of Feb. 3, 1787, 1786-1787 Del. Laws 26 (awarding John Fitch a monopoly for
the construction and operation of the steamboat); Act of Feb. 14, 1799, 1799 Ga. Laws 78
(incorporating the Savannah Navigation Company to improve navigation along the Savannah River); Ch. 22, 1770 Md. Laws 4 (conﬁrming a contract between Nehemiah Tilghman
and Solomon Townsend); Ch. 1, 1769 Md. Laws 1 (naturalizing Peter Haldimand); Act of

8.

9.
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today be handled by an agency or court. Early American states and the federal
government also used private acts to secure private investment in projects that
a government today would simply undertake itself. For example, a petitioner
might offer to build and maintain a needed road in exchange for the exclusive
right to collect tolls, or he might invest in new technology like steam-powered
ferries in exchange for the exclusive right to all ferryboat traﬃc on the Hudson
River. 10 In an era of low institutional and bureaucratic capacity, governments
used the private-act process to induce private parties to perform needed public
services. 11
In keeping with the highly speciﬁc character of these laws, the process for
adopting private acts often differed from that used for adopting public legislation. A petitioner would often include aﬃdavits in his or her request, and legislatures would sometimes hear evidence and even cross-examine witnesses before voting on a bill. 12 Private legislation could embody a bargain between the
Sept. 20, 1793, ch. 4, 1793 Mass. Acts 22 (authorizing James Osgood, guardian of Jane Osgood, to sell land belonging to her deceased father for Jane’s beneﬁt); Act of Nov. 29, 1794,
ch. 504, 1794 N.J. Laws 959 (authorizing John Perry to make conveyances to George Budd
and Adam Inger from the estates of William and Jonathan Sleeper); Act of Mar. 17, 1797,
1797 N.Y. Laws 48 (paying Nicholas Aldridge to release his claim to lands conveyed to him
by the state); Act of Mar. 19, 1774, ch. 51, 1774-1775 N.Y. Laws 82 (enabling Lewis Morris
and John Sickles to build a bridge across the Harlem River); Act of Sept. 11, 1761, ch. 1154,
1761 N.Y. Laws 395 (naturalizing 150 people); 1813 N.C. Sess. Laws 42 (listing a range of
private acts); Act of Nov. 18, 1782, ch. 41, 1782-1783 Pa. Laws 81 (providing relief to a jailed
debtor); Act of Feb. 20, 1768, ch. 576, 1759-1776 Pa. Laws 279 (incorporating an insurance
company); Act of Dec. 7, 1791, ch. 41, 1791 Va. Acts 18 (authorizing Francis Thornton to
build a toll bridge across the Rappahannock River).
10.
11.

12.

Act of Mar. 27, 1798, ch. 55, 1798 N.Y. Laws 215, 216.
Scholars have made fascinating discoveries about early America by attending to this type of
early American lawmaking. See Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1538 (2018) (arguing that “[m]uch of what we now call the
modern ‘administrative state’ grew out of the petition process” and its resulting private bills
“in Congress”). See generally Christine A. Desan, Remaking Constitutional Tradition at the
Margin of the Empire: The Creation of Legislative Adjudication in Colonial New York, 16 LAW &
HIST. REV. 257 (1998) (discussing the colonial New York legislature’s use of the petition
process and resulting private lawmaking to siphon substantive areas of law away from the
courts).
See, e.g., Act of May 10, 1770, 1770 Conn. Pub. Acts 352 (establishing procedures for the consideration of petitions, prayers, and memorials to the general assembly); Act of Feb. 21,
1778, ch. 14, 1778 N.J. Laws 29 (granting Mr. Stiles’s petition to divorce Abigail, on account
of his “being no longer able to endure the Misconduct, Extravagance, Drunkenness, Lewdness and Adultery” for which his wife had become infamous, after an “examination of witnesses” established her guilt); JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGIS.-COUNCIL OF THE
STATE OF N.J. 18 (11th Sess. 1786) (“The House resumed the Consideration of the Bill, intitled ‘An Act to repeal an Act, intitled, An Act for remedying certain Defects in the Testa-
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legislature and a private party—selling government land in exchange for payment, for instance—but it did not always take a bargained-for form. It could
also be simply a matter of sovereign grace.
The Founding generation understood different types of legislation to entail
different methods of interpretation. In brief, public laws received broad, purpose-directed interpretations while private acts received strict, literal interpretations. The Federal Constitution of 1787 was a novel legal instrument, but
American lawyers did not make up new principles of interpretation out of
whole cloth. They made use of conventions of interpretation already in common use. Disagreements over how to interpret the Constitution were, therefore, also disagreements about which form of written law provided the best
analogy. This is the critical context for some of the most famous and formative
moments in early American legal history. The debate over whether the Constitution was a compact among the states or whether it sprang from the assembled people was, at bottom, a debate over whether it was more like a legislative
bargain memorialized in a private act or whether it was more like a public act
announcing the law of the land. The principles of interpretation that ﬂowed
from this distinction supplied the doctrinal heritage for the opposing sides in
the ﬁrst arguments about constitutional interpretation, including those concerning the Bank of the United States, the Alien and Sedition Acts, and internal
improvements.
Understanding this essential framework brings the most important precedents of the era into sharper view. 13 It allows us to fully appreciate Marshall’s
ment and Last Will of Thomas Shreve, late of the County of Salem, deceased, and to establish and conﬁrm the said Testament and Last Will;’ and proceeded to the Hearing of the
Parties: The Parties not having gone through their Evidence, the further Consideration of
the said Bill was postponed until To-morrow Morning ten o’Clock.” The next day, Wednesday, November 15, 1786, the Journal states that the House resumed consideration of the Bill,
the parties went through their evidence, and the “Bill was ordered a third reading.”).
13.

The central goal of this Article is to uncover an intellectual history that allows us to better
understand the most important precedents of early America. But understanding how the
Founding generation thought about constitutional interpretation has signiﬁcance for other
ongoing debates as well. For instance, a new group of originalist scholars says that we
should not just focus on the Framers’ intent or original public meaning but rather should
follow the interpretive methodology of the Framers themselves. See John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1321, 1411 (2018) (arguing that “original-methods originalism offers the best understanding
of originalism” because the Founders used legalisms and referred to legal interpretive principles during drafting and ratiﬁcation); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original
Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009); see also Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change,
38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 821 (2015) (arguing for “‘original-law originalism’: the view
that the Constitution should be read according to its original legal content, whatever that
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statesmanship in Marbury v. Madison, 14 to understand the stakes of Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 15 and to get Marshall right in McCulloch v. Maryland. 16 What
did Marshall mean when he declared that “it is a constitution we are expounding”? 17 To whom was he speaking? This statement, coming at the end of a paragraph advocating broad principles of interpretation, committed the Court to
one side of an ongoing debate over how the Constitution must be characterized. 18 As this Article explains, Marshall meant that he saw the Constitution as
the ultimate public law. The interpretive principles he applied followed directly
from that premise. 19
Part I outlines the distinctions early Americans drew between private and
public statutes and the rules of statutory interpretation applicable to each category. These insights contribute to conversations in the ﬁeld of statutory interpretation. 20 Part I shows how the Founders understood their own law of statumight have been” by “read[ing] the document’s text . . . according to the rules of the time,
legal and otherwise, for turning enacted text into law”).
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
15.
16.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).

17.

Id. at 407.
18. See id. Marshall took oﬃce as Chief Justice in the midst of this ongoing argument. If it were
a physical brawl, we would picture him entering a room in which chairs were ﬂying, with
inkpots and other missiles strewn on the ﬂoor, picking up a chair as a shield, and ﬁnding a
weapon of his own. Well, now it’s 2020, and the room has been emptied and turned into a
museum exhibit—and Marshall’s footprints remain imprinted on the carpet. Much legal
scholarship involves standing in that room and wondering, why did the great John Marshall
take such a circuitous path? Was he pirouetting, because he was such a special genius? Or
did men in the olden days just “walk funny”? One of the projects of legal history is to refuse
to take legal opinions as though they announce a context-free gospel, and to instead recover
the furniture that littered the room. Legal history makes visible all of the obstacles that explain a chosen path. Quite simply, the debate over whether the Constitution was more like
public or private legislation was one of those big obstacles that the Marshall Court could not
pass through. The Court worked around it or confronted it. It was always there.
19.

This Article is in conversation with one of the most inﬂuential articles of the 1980s, H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 894902 (1985), which also argued that the Founders applied different interpretive conventions
to different types of law. See generally Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 571-76 (2003) (grappling with the implications of Powell’s article for
originalism). But Powell did not seem to appreciate the differences, central to this Article,
between the principles of interpretation applied to private and public acts. Instead, he argued that the Federalists sought to apply an undifferentiated set of statutory-interpretation
principles to the Constitution, while Jeffersonian Republicans sought to apply the interpretive methodology used for private contracts.

20.

The only other major work on these early American methods has been in the context of a
debate between John Manning and Bill Eskridge over whether early American judges prac-
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tory interpretation and why different rules applied to different types of laws. As
that Part explains, the motivations for these rules were tied to characteristics of
the laws themselves and far divorced from the modern obsession with the
metes and bounds of the judicial role.
As Part I explains, however, these two paradigms of interpretation were not
limited to the statutory-interpretation context. The rationale justifying strict
interpretation of private acts applied to other legal instruments, like treaties.
And, many thought, the rationale behind broad, equitable construction of public acts applied to the new Federal Constitution. The purpose of Part I is not to
suggest that the Founders thought the new Constitution was legislation. The
point is to highlight the two paradigms of interpretation in the Founding era’s
legal vocabulary using statutory interpretation, a common application of those
paradigms. When deciding which paradigm of interpretation should apply to
the new Constitution, they were deciding which other legal instruments provided the best analogies.
Part II explains the relevance of these paradigms to the Founding generation’s debates over constitutional interpretation. It argues that proponents of
the view that the Constitution was a “compact”—whether they used the language of treaty, contract, or legislative bargain—were arguing that the Constitution was subject to the rules of interpretation applicable to private legislation.
Scholars have mostly treated the connection between the compact theory and
strict construction as self-evident, failing to demonstrate why the designation
as a compact, on its own, necessitated a narrow interpretive lens. I argue that
the “compact” term signaled that the same quality justifying strict construction
in the private act or treaty context—namely, the limited delegation of power by
a sovereign—obtained with the new constitution. That is why the term entailed
strict construction. And that is why the term also imported the rest of the suite
of rules applicable to private acts, including attention to legislative history
(known now as “original intent”) and a preference for amendment to ﬁx defects. 21
ticed textualist or pragmatic interpretation of legislation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 17761806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 995-96 (2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 91 (2001). But see Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L.
REV. 712, 715 (2018) (suggesting that neither scholar fully accounted for how the judicial
role has changed).
21.

Along the way, I raise a methodological point: to understand a word like “compact,” it is not
enough to understand its dictionary deﬁnition, or even its linguistic context. A scholar must
also understand its intellectual history. Cf. DANIEL T. RODGERS, CONTESTED TRUTHS: KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1987) (demonstrating brilliantly that
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Part III uses this framework to reevaluate cases on every Constitutional
Law syllabus, including Marbury v. Madison, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Cohens v. Virginia. 22 This Article demonstrates that an
early American debate over whether the written Constitution should be interpreted according to the rules applicable to public or private legislation underlies each of these major moments in early American legal history. The insights
of Part III should change how these cases are taught, because they reveal a key
intellectual thread connecting these cases to each other and help to place them
in the context of the broader legal culture of their time.
Part IV connects these insights to contemporary theoretical debates. As this
Article explains, the public-act analogy was a leading view during the Founding era. Those who believed that the Constitution should be construed using
the rules commonly applied to public legislation assumed that courts would
read its provisions to respond to new problems and conditions that its drafters
and ratiﬁers could not have foreseen. 23 The historical pedigree of this dynamic,
ﬂexible approach should challenge those who claim that a narrow, restrictive
reading of the Constitution is more faithful to the Framers’ intent.
Part IV also presses a methodological point too often overlooked in contemporary debates over how early American lawyers and judges approached
words have their own intellectual history). And because we are talking about an era in which
lawyers trained in apprenticeships, and not in schools, the intellectual context found in
learned texts is not enough. It is also important to know a word’s practice context. We must
ask, what would a lawyer in practice at this time have understood this word to mean? What
were the litigation strategies, the precedential connotations, the arguments and counterarguments, that a word or phrase would have suggested to a late eighteenth-century or early
nineteenth-century lawyer? This Article explores the word “compact” in these terms. In the
process, it demonstrates that these types of questions cannot be answered out of a dictionary, whatever its vintage.
22. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
23.

This insight will be relevant to law-and-literature and living-constitutionalism theorists.
See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 390-91 (1982) (arguing
that the Constitution admits many readings which could transform the political order); see
also James Boyd White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L.
REV. 415, 416-18 (1982) [hereinafter White, Law as Language] (arguing that it is “absurd to
speak as if the meaning of a text were always simply there to be observed and demonstrated
in some quasi-scientiﬁc way”). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 39-44 (1991) (concluding that constitutional law is “a relatively autonomous part of
our culture,” but that periods of extraordinary mobilization have led to “acts of constitutional creation that rivaled the Founding Federalists’ in their scope and depth”); JAMES BOYD
WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973) [hereinafter WHITE, LEGAL IMAGINATION] (arguing
that legal language can shift and reconstitute legal practice); Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting
the Women’s Movement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1421, 1425-27 (2006) (contending that social
movements can shift culture and, over time, change constitutional interpretation).

13

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722302

the yale law journal

130:2

2020

problems of interpretation. It argues that an anachronistic focus on early federal courts has limited scholarship in this area. Because only the state courts had
a broad range of jurisdiction and because of their relative prestige and importance, state courts collected the greatest legal talent. The inﬂuence of some
state-court judges during the nineteenth century rivaled that of any Supreme
Court Justice. 24 State-level sources are therefore critical to understanding the
mainstream of American legal thought of this era.
Like the unwarranted focus on federal courts, a preoccupation with contemporary interpretive debates risks distorting our reading of the historical
record. If our purpose is to discover what the Framers really thought, we must
take early American jurists seriously as sophisticated legal thinkers with their
own culturally and historically speciﬁc views.
i. early americ an statutes and two paradigms of
founding-era interp retation
“On the abstract principles which govern courts in construing legislative
acts, no difference of opinion can exist,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1805.25
“It is only in the application of those principles that the difference discovers itself.” 26 As divided as judges and scholars now are on theories of statutory interpretation, this statement could not be made in seriousness today. Yet the
same basic interpretive methods existed in the early Republic. A scholar looking to support the claim that the Founders were textualists will ﬁnd plenty of
evidence in the record; a scholar countering that claim will ﬁnd plenty of interpretation that looks purposive and pragmatic as well. 27 But if the same methodologies existed then, how could Marshall have thought there were “no
difference[s] of opinion” on the principles of statutory interpretation? The answer is that judges consistently applied these different methods to different categories of legislation. The difference of opinion, if there was one, often concerned not which method should apply, but what kind of statute was at issue.

24.

See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 20, at 717 (“In his own time and for the generation that followed, James Kent’s jurisdiction was more important to American law than John Marshall’s.”).
25. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
26.
27.

Id.
Compare Manning, supra note 20, at 8-9 (arguing that evidence from the Founding era cannot be read in support of purposivism), with Eskridge, supra note 20, at 995-98 (arguing
that it can).
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Lawyers and judges of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries
distinguished between “private acts” and “public acts.” 28 “Special or private acts
are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns,” Blackstone explained. 29 A law “to prevent
spiritual persons from making leases for longer terms than twenty one years, or
three lives, is a public act; it being a rule prescribed to the whole body of spiritual persons in the nation.” 30 On the other hand, “an act to enable the bishop
of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years . . . concerns only the parties
and the bishop’s successors; and is therefore a private act.” 31 Fortunatus
Dwarris gave a similar explanation in his 1835 treatise on statutes: “[p]ublic
acts relate to the kingdom at large” whereas “private acts” “concern only a particular species, thing, or person” or relate only “to certain individuals or to particular classes of men.” 32
The rules for interpreting each type of legislation were so different that a
decision about categorization could easily determine the outcome of a case.
Most laws were easy to classify as one type or the other. But there were instances, as when a statute concerned a large but discrete group of people, it became
“diﬃcult to draw the line between a public and private act . . . .” 33 Litigation involving statutes like these often included lengthy, learned, and clever arguments from counsel over the statute’s taxonomy. 34 Alexander Hamilton made a
throwaway argument to this effect in Rutgers v. Waddington, a case in which he
represented a loyalist property owner seeking compensation for conﬁscations
during the Revolutionary War. 35 The argument that the statute was a private
act because it targeted a discrete class of people was a long shot, but a sophisticated lawyer like Hamilton thought it was worth making.

28.

See, e.g., Jones v. Maffet, 5 Serg. & Rawle 523, 533 (Pa. 1820) (“The distinction between public and private acts is great.”).
29. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *86.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.; see also RICHARD BURN, BURN’S ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 129 (Dover,
N.H., Eliphalet Ladd 2d ed. 1792) (describing the distinction between “general acts of parliament” on the one hand, and “private acts of parliament” on the other).

32.

FORTUNATUS DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON
STRUCTION 3 (Phila., John S. Littell 1835).

33.

1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 429 (N.Y.C., O. Halsted 1826).
See, e.g., ARGUMENTS AND JUDGMENT OF THE MAYOR’S COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK IN
A CAUSE BETWEEN ELIZABETH RUTGERS AND JOSHUA WADDINGTON 14-15 (N.Y.C., Samuel
Loudon 1784) [hereinafter ARGUMENTS AND JUDGEMENT OF THE MAYOR’S COURT].

34.

35.

STATUTES;

AND

THEIR RULES

OF

CON-

Alexander Hamilton, Brief No. 6, in 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 362, 387 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964).
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Private statutes, which often involved grants of land or the award of a monopoly or other thing of value, committed the state’s property or power and
created vested rights. 36 Courts interpreting this type of statute focused on discerning the subjective understanding and intentions of the legislative grantors
and petitioning grantees. Public acts, by contrast, were the law of the land,
forward-looking guidelines construed to address both the mischief that inspired them and whatever circumstances might arise in the same vein.
A. Private Acts Received Strict Interpretations; Public Acts Received Broad and
Purpose-Oriented Interpretations.
If the style of interpretation applicable to private acts had a theme, it was
the comparison of private legislation to contracts and other private-law transactions. Indeed, some courts resisted treating private acts as laws at all. Only
“[c]onfusion” would “arise[]” “from considering these acts of the legislature as

36.

When I presented an earlier draft of this Article, I was asked whether this provides any insights for scholarship on vested-rights doctrine. In brief, what scholars call the vested-rights
doctrine arose shortly after the Founding in reaction to the rapidly expanding power of state
legislatures. See Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1421, 1434-35 (1999); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 403-13 (1998) (describing early American anxieties about legislative
power); Edward S. Corwin, Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV.
247, 255-56 (1914) (discussing the vested-rights doctrine as a protection against the legislature). Recent scholarship on the meaning of the Due Process Clause has fueled a new interest in the doctrine. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1737-38 (2012); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only
Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 423-24 (2010). Rooted in natural-law concepts, the doctrine was initially concerned with retroactive legislation affecting rights that
had “vested,” and, some argue, it expanded over the course of the nineteenth century to take
on broader connotations. See Edward S. Corwin, Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the
Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 383-85 (1911). This Part adds important context. In the
context of early American legislation, the concept of “vested rights” would have been relevant to the kind of rights created under private, rather than public, legislation. The core case
in which a right could be said to have “vested” would be a property grant under a private
statute, and rights created by public legislation would require increasingly tricky legal reasoning. An interesting project would be to explore how, when, and why this core of easy cases expanded over time. On a related note, a good starting point for thinking about the diﬃcult but meaningful distinction early Americans drew between the type of legislation that
trenched on private property, triggering a duty to compensate the owner, and the type of law
that, as a public act, merely regulated private property in the public interest, is Bill Novak’s
interpretation of Commonwealth v. Alger in The People’s Welfare. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at
19-20.
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laws; whereas they are grants,” a Massachusetts court explained in the 1820s.37
A private bill, the court counseled, was like a “contract” and should be construed that way. 38 New York’s highest court reminded litigants in 1811 that “a
law thus made . . . is yet looked upon more as a private conveyance, than as the
solemn act of the legislature.” 39 Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court said the same in
a 1822 case. 40 A private act, that court summarized, is “a compact, the parties to
which” are the beneﬁciaries “and the state.” 41
Like a party to a private contract or conveyance, a legislature that passed a
private act conferred rights on its beneﬁciaries that could not simply be revoked
or cast aside by future legislatures. 42 Chief Justice Marshall underscored the
point in Fletcher v. Peck, a suit that centered on the Georgia legislature’s effort to
repeal a previous legislature’s grant of territory to several private companies.
Georgia asserted that “one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a
former legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot
abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.” 43 Chief Justice Marshall disagreed. This “principle” is “correct[]” “so far as it respects general [or public]
legislation,” he explained. 44 But a private act was different: “[I]f an act be done
under a law, a succeeding legislature cannot undo it. The past cannot be re-

37.

Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344,
445 (1829), aff ’d, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
38. Id. at 443. In fact, private acts were to be even more narrowly construed than contracts between individuals. As the court explained, “in governmental grants nothing passes by implication,” while a private subject’s grant by private contract might include more than what is
explicitly expressed if necessary for the operation of the grant. Id. at 469. Because private
acts often created vested rights, for instance by granting a monopoly or conveying land, they
tended to diminish the resources and discretion available to future legislators. Because they
amounted to a limitation on the people’s future power, courts held that “[n]o restraint upon
this authority can be raised by implication.” Id. at 471; see also Whetcroft v. Dorsey, 3 H. &
McH. 357, 388 (Md. 1795) (“[A]s the act under which the proceedings were had is a private
act, the authority delegated by it must be strictly pursued . . . .”).
39. Catlin v. Jackson ex dem. Gratz, 8 Johns. 520, 556 (N.Y. 1811) (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 29, at *346); see also Donelly v. Vandenbergh, 3 Johns. 27, 40 (N.Y. 1808) (opinion of
Spencer, J.) (stating that private laws should be interpreted similarly to contracts).
40.

In re St. Mary’s Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 517, 559-60 (Pa. 1822) (“[I]t is rather a private conveyance than a solemn act of legislation.”).

41.

Id. at 560.
See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819) (holding
that the private charter of Dartmouth College “is a contract, the obligation of which cannot
be impaired, without violating the constitution of the United States”).

42.

43.
44.

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
Id.
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called by the most absolute power.” 45 Once a legislature granted away title to
state lands, it was out of the people’s hands forever.
Private acts could also constrain sovereign authority in another way. Many
private acts were public-private bargains that granted public rights for private
consideration. Thus, in 1798, New York’s legislature granted Robert Livingston
a monopoly over the business of ferrying passengers across the Hudson “to the
end that [he] may be induced to proceed in an experiment which if successful
promises important advantages to this State.” 46 That choice took certain options off the table for the people of New York. If another inventor came along
with a faster, safer steamboat, the state would have had nothing left to offer.
Nor could New York establish its own public steamboat shuttle to compete
with Livingston’s monopoly.
The fact that they relinquished or constrained the sovereign people’s power
is one reason private acts were subject to narrowing rules of construction.
While private contracts were usually construed against the grantor, the opposite was true of private statutes. 47 In the Charles River Bridge case, Justice Baldwin traced this principle to the common-law rule that royal grants should be
construed against the grantee. It would be “diﬃcult to assign a good reason,”
he contended, “why a grant by a colony or state, should be so construed as to
impair the right of the people to their common property, to a greater extent in
Massachusetts, than a grant by the king would in England.” 48 The states, no
less than the king, were entitled to the beneﬁt of that prerogative to protect the
people from disadvantageous bargains. Chief Justice Taney built on this point
in his opinion: “The continued existence of a government would be of no great
value,” he contended, “if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of
the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation; and the functions
it was designed to perform, transferred to [private] hands.” 49 The “abandonment” of public authority “ought not to be presumed,” therefore, where “the
deliberate purpose of the state to abandon it does not appear.” 50
45.

Id.

46.

Act of Mar. 27, 1798, ch. 55, 1798 N.Y. Laws 215, 216.
See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.)
344, 469 (1829) (opinion of Morton, J.), aff ’d, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) (stating that “the
king’s grant shall not enure to any other intent than that which is precisely expressed in the
grant” (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *248)).
48. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 650 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
47.

49.
50.

Id. at 548.
Id.; see also Jackson ex dem. Clark v. Reeves, 3 Cai. 293, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (“[I]t is a
general rule of law, that in the exposition of governmental grants, that construction, when
the terms are inexplicit, shall be adopted which is least favourable to the grantee.”); City of
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These guiding principles were echoed in state courts across the young Republic. As Chancellor Kent explained in a New York case, when an act did not
“concern[] the public,” but was a matter of “mere private convenience and
proﬁt,” it “ought to be strictly construed, and not carried beyond the plain letter of the act.” 51 Private statutes “ought to receive a strict and limited construction,” agreed a member of the Massachusetts high court, and “ought not to be
extended by implication,” but instead must be “construed . . . strictly.” 52 In all
these cases, “a sound and wholesome rule of construction” was that private acts
“are not to be enlarged by doubtful implications” or “extended by construction
beyond [the] clear and obvious meaning.” 53 In these laws, “nothing passes by
implication” and the legislature is “not to be presumed” to have “granted farther than the express words of the grant will warrant.” 54 A court in Maine
agreed that a “private act or grant . . . must be construed by a careful examination of its language.” 55 When a private act granted certain privileges or powers,
the act “should be literally pursued,” said a Maryland advocate in a case he won
for his client in 1795, “otherwise all acts done in virtue thereof are deemed
void.” 56
In fact, so tied were courts to the precise language of private acts that many
American jurisdictions followed the British rule requiring that a private act be
set forth in its entirety in the pleadings. This was an era before statutes were
New-York v. Scott, 1 Cai. 543, 548 (N.Y. 1804) (“No implied grant is contained in the act of
the legislature.”).
51.
52.

Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. 463, 471 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
Charles River Bridge, 24 Mass. at 469-70 (opinion of Morton, J.).

53.

Id. at 476-77 (opinion of Wilde, J.).
54. Id. at 469-70 (opinion of Morton, J.); see also People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Utica Ins. , 15 Johns.
358, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) (“[A]n incorporated company have no rights except such as are
specially granted, and those that are necessary to carry into effect the powers so granted.
Many powers and capacities are tacitly annexed to a corporation duly created; but they are
such only as are necessary to carry into effect the purposes for which it was established. The
speciﬁcation of certain powers operates as a restraint to such objects only, and is an implied
prohibition of the exercise of other and distinct powers.”).
55.
56.

Thomas v. Mahan, 4 Me. 513, 517 (1827).
Whetcroft v. Dorsey, 3 H. & McH. 357, 368 (Md. 1795); see also Wilcox v. Sherwin, 1 D.
Chip. 72, 83 (Vt. 1797) (“[T]he corporate acts of any town, are to all but the inhabitants,
who are members of the corporation, private acts—they are unknown to others. Courts can
know nothing of them but by proof. . . . The power of a town, as a corporation, is not general; it is limited both as to the subject matter and the mode of exercising it. For instance,
should the inhabitants presume to vote a tax to raise a sum of money, for the purpose of setting up a manufactory, the subject not being within the powers given by law to towns, the
vote would be illegal and void.”), overruling recognized by Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609, 613
(1843).
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reliably published and disseminated, and even where they were, publications
often left out private acts. As Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court explained, when
the laws under consideration were “private acts,” those “contain[ing] grants,
privileges and immunities to an individual,” then it is “his interest and his duty,
as they are the muniments of his private rights, to have the strongest possible
evidence of their existence.” 57 Some courts refused to take cognizance of the
private act if it had not been adequately pleaded. 58
Courts faced with public acts approached the business of interpretation
differently. Rather than hewing to the text, they sought to effectuate the purpose of those laws, even if that required going against their literal meaning.
That approach ﬂowed from the contemporary understanding of the role of
public acts. All nonpenal public statutes were thought of as “remedial”—that is,
they were intended to address some defect in the common law.59 “There are
three points to be considered in the construction of all remedial statutes,”
Blackstone explained in a passage often cited by American jurists: “the old law,
the mischief, and the remedy . . . and it is the business of the judges so to construe the act, as to suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.” 60 In other
words, a Pennsylvania court explained, “the reason which induced the Legislature to make such acts as take away the common law,” provides “the rule by
which the acts ought to be construed.” 61 When construing this kind of statute,
explained Chancellor Kent of New York, it was appropriate for judges to take
into account “the immense pressure of the public interest.” 62 All such “acts
57.
58.

Jones v. Maffet, 5 Serg. & Rawle 523, 534 (Pa. 1820).
See, e.g., Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. at 364, 384 (counsel arguing that if the legislature’s private
act is not properly entered into the record, the defendant “might as well have referred to a
decree of the national convention of France, or a mandate of the empress of Russia” and the
court agreeing that “[i]f the defendant pleads a private act of the legislature, it must appear
on the record”); Bank of Utica v. Smedes, 3 Cow. 662, 682-83 (N.Y. 1824) (stating that “the
rule is inﬂexible, that a private statute must be set forth at large in pleading,” and citing cases
to that effect); Jenkins v. Union Tpk. Rd., 1 Cai. Cas. 86, 92-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (“The
ﬁrst point to be determined, is, the class to which the act of the legislature, on which this action has been brought, is to be assigned; if a public act, every part of it is, in legal intendment, in the knowledge of the court, as the general law of the land. If a private act, it can only
be so far attended to, as the parties, by their pleadings, have made it an object of judicial conusance.”); see also Maffet, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 534 (explaining that oﬃcially printed statutes
are prima facie evidence of the law).

59.

13 CHARLES PETERSDORFF, A PRACTICAL AND ELEMENTARY ABRIDGEMENT OF THE CASES 193
n.* (N.Y.C., W.R.H. Treadway 1831).

60.

1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *87. For jurists quoting this passage, see, for example, Lloyd
v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. 1807).

61.

Levinz v. Will, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 430, 434 (Pa. 1789).
Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 342 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).

62.
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made pro bono publico,” that is, in service of the public welfare, “are to have a
liberal construction,” said the New Jersey Supreme Court. 63
Indeed, when interpreting public acts, “courts of law” “almost invariably
pursu[ed] the spirit and meaning of law, in preference to the strict letter.” 64 As
New York’s highest court explained, it would be a mistake to rely on the words
of the statute without regard to “the cause or necessity of making the statute”
and sometimes “other circumstances” that gave the statute context. 65 Only
through examining this context could a court ﬁnd the statute’s true “intention”
which “ought to be followed, . . . although such construction seem contrary to
the letter of the statute.” 66 Using a typical formulation applicable to the interpretation of public acts, and public acts only, the court summarized: “A thing
which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the
statute as if it were within the letter,” whereas “a thing which is within the letter

63.

State v. Helmes, 3 N.J.L. 1050, 1061 (1813). This rule sometimes even extended to “highly
penal statutes” which were “often taken by intendment,” that is, interpreted beyond the express language in order to effectuate their intention. Id. While the canon that penal statutes
should be strictly construed was often cited, New Jersey’s court was correct to point out that
penal statutes were also on occasion broadened to effectuate their purpose. See Pierce v.
Hopper (1720) 93 Eng. Rep. 503, 504-09; 1 Strange 249, 250-58 (stating arguments of counsel and citations to such an effect); see also Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295, 299-300 (1815) (expanding a statute punishing fraudulent conveyance to prohibit a conveyance that would defeat the claims of a judgment creditor even though the statute’s text only protected the claims
of contract creditors); State v. Walker, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 661 (1817) (holding that even though
the indictment for forgery under the forgery statute was insuﬃciently proven, no appeal
would be taken, because the defendant was still guilty of forgery as deﬁned under the common law); Stewart v. Keemle, 4 Serg. & Rawle 72, 73-74 (Pa. 1818) (“Even in the construction of penal statutes, the expression has been departed from in order to comply with the
manifest spirit and interest of the law. . . . Even tenderness to criminals does not require
such a construction of words, perhaps not absolutely clear, as would tend to destroy and
evade the very end and intention of the statute.”); ARGUMENTS AND JUDGMENT OF THE
MAYOR’S COURT, supra note 34, at 15 (“That even in the construction of a penal statute the
intention [of the legislature] is to be regarded . . . [and] [t]hat a court ought so to construe a
statute as not to suffer it to be eluded.”).

64.

Lloyd, 2 N.J.L. at 218.
65. People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Utica Ins., 15 Johns. 358, 380 (N.Y. 1818); cf. Dorsey’s Lessee v.
Hammond, 1 H. & J. 190, 192 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1801) (concerning a private act, and holding
that “the court cannot resort to, or draw any aid from circumstances or facts extrinsic the
grant, unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty in the description of the person who is
to take or the thing which is to pass” (emphasis omitted)), rev’d, 1 H. & J. 201 (Md. 1803).
66.

Utica Ins., 15 Johns. at 380-81; see also Marshall v. Lovelass, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 412, 435
(Super. Ct. Law & Eq. 1801) (stating that when the makers’ “intent” may be “discovered
from the cause or necessity of making an act,” that intent “must be followed with reason and
discretion in the construction of an act, although against the letter of it”).
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of the statute, is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention of the
makers.” 67
Once judges identiﬁed the legislators’ purposes, they often resorted to equitable interpretation to effectuate those purposes. That meant that they felt free
to depart from the language of the statute if it did not ﬁt their understanding of
the statute’s spirit or, “[i]n doubtful cases,” to “enlarge the construction of an
act of Assembly” so as to complete the legislature’s remedial work. 68 Judges did
not hesitate to extend statutory language to cover circumstances they thought
to be “within” the scope of “the mischief” the legislature had meant to address,
“even should its letter not explicitly authorize it.” 69 It seemed only natural, ex-

67.

Utica Ins., 15 Johns. at 381. H. Jefferson Powell argued that the Founders believed that the
“‘intent’ of any legal document is the product of the interpretive process and not some ﬁxed
meaning that the author locks into the document’s text at the outset.” Powell, supra note 19,
at 910. Cases dealing with public-act interpretation likely drove this conclusion. Responsive
articles, including Caleb Nelson’s Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, have chronicled
just how much conversation, both critical and admiring, Powell’s thesis provoked. See, e.g.,
Nelson, supra note 19 at 524-25 (citing, among other work, HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 5051 (1990); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 29 (1998); Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reﬂections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 94 & n.48 (1997); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226,
281 (1988); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988)); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1242-43 (2007) (participating in the conversation chronicled by Nelson, supra note 19); Logan E. Sawyer III, Principle
and Politics in the New History of Originalism, 57 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 198, 207 n.76 (2017) (explaining the place of Powell’s article in the intellectual history of modern originalism). In
fact, there is evidence on both sides of the question because the thesis was too broadly stated. It is true that the Founders would have expected judges to apply an idealized intent to a
public law and that, at the time of framing and ratiﬁcation, many Americans thought a written Constitution was more like a public law. It is not true, however, that Americans would
have expected judges to treat “any legal document” that way. Private acts, treaties, and contracts were subject to stricter rules of interpretation.
68. Levinz v. Will, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 430, 434 (Pa. 1789); see also Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110, 121
(Pa. 1809) (stating that courts must “carry into execution the true intention of the lawgivers,
and . . . in some instances, to attain this end, the words of the law have been enlarged, and
in other instances, restricted”).
69. Ex parte Leland, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 460, 466 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. 1819); see also
Moore’s Ex’rs v. Gwathmey, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 334, 334 (1811) (“It would be a rigid construction
of this act to conﬁne its provisions to those who sue or are sued in their own right. The act is
a remedial one, and ought to receive a liberal construction. The mischief intended to be
remedied, was the delay in the administration of justice. Claims against executors or administrators, being within the mischief, ought to be embraced by the remedy.”); Hersha v.
Brenneman, 6 Serg. & Rawle 2, 4 (Pa. 1820) (“[I]f . . . rigidity of construction were to pre-
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plained Vermont’s eminent jurist Nathaniel Chipman, that judges should play a
role that in effect contributed to the legislative process, as “judges, from the nature of their oﬃcial employment, are informed of the diﬃculties, which arise in
the interpretation of the laws, and of those cases, in which they prove deﬁcient,
unequal, or unjust in their operation.” 70
Judges also took it upon themselves to weave smoothly together legislative
innovations and common law norms. In doing so, they refused to “impute[] to
the Legislature” meanings that were “pregnant with . . . absurdity and inconveniency.” 71 Instead, although “[t]he words of the Act” would “seem to warrant” one result, a court might hold that “the absurdities of that construction
incline us to a different one.” 72 When the words of a statute suggested an unjust result, a judge might explain that “[r]espect for the legislature forbids me
to entertain an opinion that such was their real intention.” 73
B. Courts Interpreting Private Acts Looked to the Subjective Intentions of the
Actual Legislators; Courts Interpreting Public Acts Looked to the Intentions of
an Idealized Legislature.
Courts sought to discover the legislature’s intent in all statutoryinterpretation cases. But “intent” meant very different things depending on
vail, it would prevent grandchildren from petitioning the Court,” a potential class of beneﬁciaries of the law under consideration that, “[a]lthough not within the words, . . . are so entirely within the equity of the act.”); Dilliard v. Tomlinson, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 183, 211 (1810)
(opinion of Roane, J.) (“I will not bottom myself upon the mere letter of the statute . . . and
obstinately contend for a construction which is reprobated by the actual nature of the subject.”); Browne v. Turberville, 6 Va. (2 Call) 390, 403 (1800) (opinion of Lyons, J.) (“It is a
rule in the construction of statutes, that the intention, when it can be discovered, must be
followed with reason and discretion, although the interpretation may seem contrary to the
letter of the statute.”). Public-act cases often cited Heydon’s Case (1584) EWHC Exch. J 36,
[3]; 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638-9; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 7 b-8 a (“[T]he oﬃce of all the Judges is always
to make such [] construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to
suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico.”).
70.

NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 126 (Rutland, Vt., J.
Lyon 1793). For more on this tendency, see generally Peterson, supra note 20.

71.

Lewis v. Maris, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 278, 288 (Pa. Ct. Err. & App. 1788).
Laws v. Davis, 1 Del. Cas. 256, 259 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1800).

72.
73.

Stewart v. Keemle, 4 Serg. & Rawle 72, 74 (Pa. 1818); see also Waln v. Shearman, 8 Serg. &
Rawle 357, 360 (Pa. 1822) (“[G]eneral expressions are sometimes to be modiﬁed where they
are inconsistent with other parts of the same law, or of other laws on the same subject; or
where they would produce a degree of injustice not to be attributed to the legislature.”).
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whether the act in question was public or private. When interpreting a private
act, judges looked for the particular motives of the legislators who had passed
the bill. Just as in a case involving a “contract[] of individuals,” courts considering such acts sought “to effectuate” “the intention of parties.” 74 And because,
like a private contract, a private statute involved the “assent of two or more
minds,” “a private act,” like a private contract, “must be construed by a careful
examination of its language, and by no other mode.” 75
This had important consequences beyond whether a court would read the
text broadly or narrowly. Whereas a judge would construe a public act to align
with and incorporate other laws on the same topic, the in pari materia rule
could not aid the interpretation of a private act. That is because the meaning of
a private act was no more than whatever the original petitioner and the legislature acting on his petition would have understood it to be, a court explained. It
made little sense to require an “individual” to “look into and carefully examine
the language of other grants and private acts, in order to ascertain the true
meaning of the” one “made for his own beneﬁt.” 76 Instead, courts must restrict
themselves to ascertaining “the fair and honest intention of the parties,” “by resorting to the provisions of the act itself,” and “without aﬃxing to words or expressions any other than the meaning which they ordinarily bear.” 77
When interpreting public acts, by contrast, courts reasoned from the presumed intent of an idealized legislator. Their method was “to suppose the law
maker present, and . . . ask[] him the question—did you intend to comprehend
this case? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine, he being
an upright and reasonable man, would have given.” 78 Read enough of these
cases and one gets to know this imagined “reasonable legislator” very well: he
was respectful of common-law norms and also learned enough in the law to
avoid creating costly inconsistencies, unexplained windfalls, and senseless
hardships. The resulting interpretation might go well beyond the text of the
act. But if this “imagin[ary],” “upright and reasonable” “law maker” would
have meant the words “to comprehend this [interpretation],” the court could
“safely hold the case to be within the equity of the statute; for while you do no
more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to but in conformity
with the statute.” 79
74.

Donelly v. Vandenbergh, 3 Johns. 27, 40 (N.Y. 1808).
75. Thomas v. Mahan, 4 Me. 513, 516-17 (1827).
76.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
77. Id. at 517.
78.
79.

ARGUMENTS AND JUDGMENT OF THE MAYOR’S COURT, supra note 34, at 16.
Id.
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Sometimes fealty to this idealized intent required broadening narrow statutory language; other times it required making exceptions to statutes that had
none on their face. As Justice Wilson explained, “[i]n making laws, it is impossible to specify or to foresee every case,” and so judges “interpreting them”
should construe an exception to a law in “those cases . . . which the legislator
himself, had he foreseen them, would have speciﬁed and excepted.” 80 Only this
method led to the “true and sound construction” of a public act, because it
grounded interpretation in “the spirit of the law, or the motive which prevailed
on the legislature to make it.” 81
C. Legislative History Was Never Relevant to the Interpretation of a Public Act
but Could Sometimes Be Helpful when Interpreting a Private Act.
No matter the type of law at issue, the ordinary rule of statutory interpretation was that “[t]he meaning of the legislature must be eviscerated from the act
itself” with no regard to “the declaration of individual members.” 82 Legislative
history was “unallowable,” Attorney General William Wirt aﬃrmed, “in the
construction of a legislative act of a general and public nature.” 83 But because a
private act was “in truth, rather of the nature of a contract . . . than an act of
legislation,” Wirt said, the rule could bend.84 Just as an ambiguous term in a
contract might be explained with parol evidence, the legislative record could
sometimes cast light on a diﬃcult word in a private act. In other words, it
should be “allowable to look into the circumstances which led to that contract
and formed its basis.” 85 In an appropriate case, materials such as “the petition
and report of the committee, on which the act is founded, may throw some
light on its construction.” 86
“To determine the nature and effect” of private acts, Connecticut’s Supreme
Court explained in 1816, “we must consider the object of the party, and the intent of the legislature,” in part through an examination of the legislative record. 87 “Though some words may be used which might be proper in the grant
80.

2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 260 (Bird Wilson
ed., Phila., Bronson & Chauncey 1804).
81. Id.
82.

People ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Utica Ins., 15 Johns. 358, 371 (N.Y. 1818) (argument of counsel).
83. Claim of the Representative of Henry Willis, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 752, 753 (1823).
84.

Id.
85. Id.
86.
87.

Id.
Chalker v. Dickinson, 1 Conn. 510, 514 (1816).
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of exclusive rights, yet these may be explained by the allegation in the memorial” that is, in the petition or aﬃdavit the citizen had submitted to the legislature, “and we must take into view all that is said to ascertain the intent.” 88 Legislative materials also played a role in the rarer cases alleging that the
beneﬁciary of a private act had taken advantage of the legislature. In these cases, litigants tried to void a private act by proving that a petitioner had “obtained” the act “upon fraudulent suggestions.” 89 Courts were open to these arguments. Given the tendency of legislatures to “pass[] such acts . . . on the bare
suggestion of the applicants,” explained a New York court, it only made sense
to hew to the practice of granting relief whenever “the suggestions on which
the act is passed are proved fraudulent.” 90
D. Beneﬁciaries of Private Acts Had to Apply to the Legislature to Cure Any
Defects; when a Public Act Required Amendment, Courts Sometimes Supplied
One Themselves.
Another important distinction between public and private statutes was the
attitude courts took toward the possibility of amendment. Courts required private citizens, corporations, and even towns and cities, to apply to the legislature
for amendments to their private acts if they required an iota of power or privilege that extended beyond the terms of their original grant.91 By contrast,
when a public statute needed updating, judges sometimes did that work
through equitable interpretation instead of referring the law back to the legislature. As Justice Wilson’s guidance on interpretation highlighted, courts interpreting public acts would add or subtract language to account for problems or

88.

Id. at 514; see also id. at 518 (“In construing the resolve, we have, doubtless, a right to recur to
the recital, which precedes it, and the memorial, upon which it is founded, precisely as we
might, in any case, consult the preamble of a statute.”).
89. Jackson v. Nestles, 3 Johns. 115, 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
90.
91.

Catlin v. Jackson, 8 Johns. 520, 557 (N.Y. 1811).
See, e.g., Goszler v. Corp. of Georgetown, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 593, 597 (1821) (noting that
“[a] Corporation,” such as the town of Georgetown, “can make such contracts only as are allowed by the acts of incorporation”); Johnson v. Hills, 1 Root 504, 504 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1793) (recognizing that “if” the beneﬁciary of a private act believes his act is poorly drawn,
“the legislature will correct it”). While such rules were consistent over this period, the distinction between what was thought of as public and private legislation did evolve. The evolution in how Americans thought about cities and towns, and whether they were private enterprises or entities of public obligation and trust, has been the subject of a fascinating book.
HARTOG, supra note 8, at 179-239; see also Frug, supra note 8, at 677. The methods judges applied to interpret the relevant statutes are another way to measure the evolution of the public/private distinction in the history of the city and in other contexts.
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opportunities that the enacting legislature may not have “foreseen.” 92 New
York’s Chancellor Kent decided, more than once, to interpret the statutes authorizing the construction of the Erie Canal to extend the powers state surveyors and other oﬃcers needed, or to afford compensation to citizens disrupted
by the work, in ways that went beyond what the text of those statutes set out. 93
To summarize, lawyers and jurists of the late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries drew a meaningful legal distinction between two different
types of statutes. Justice Wilson observed that “acts of very different kinds are
drawn and promulgated under the same form.” 94 Private acts, such as a “law to
vest or conﬁrm an estate in an individual” and “a law to incorporate a congregation or other society,” were “passed in the same manner” as any “law respecting the rights and properties of all the citizens of the state.” 95 But although
these were “clothed in the same dress of legislative formality; and are all equally
acts of the representatives of the freemen of the commonwealth,” it should not
“be pretended” that the same legal rules applied to the two types of legislation. 96 The rules applying to each were so distinct that, in cases involving statutory interpretation, categorization often determined the outcome. 97

92.

2 WILSON, supra note 80, at 260.
93. See, e.g., Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735, 740 (N.Y. 1823) (“We must take expressions in
the most extensive sense . . . the sense most suitable to the subject, and best adapted to the
facility and success of a great and generous scheme of public policy.”); Jerome v. Ross, 7
Johns. Ch. 315, 342 (N.Y. Ch. 1823) (“Statutes made for the public good, and for general and
beneﬁcent national purposes, are to receive a very liberal construction, and to be expounded
in such a manner, as that they may, as far as possible, attain the end.”). See generally Peterson, supra note 20 (discussing Chancellor Kent’s method of interpretation).
94.

3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON 414 (Bird Wilson ed., Phila., Bronson & Chauncey 1804).

95.

Id.
Id.

96.
97.

See, e.g., Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass. 269, 276 (1807) (“The determination of the ﬁrst point requires that we should ascertain the true nature and character of this legislative proceeding. If
it were a public act, predicated upon a view to the general good, the question would be more
diﬃcult. If it be a private act, obtained at the solicitation of individuals, for their private
emolument, or for the improvement of their estates, it must be construed, as to its effect and
operation, like a grant.”); see also Threadneedle v. Lynam (1675) 86 Eng. Rep. 939, 939; 2
Mod. 57, 57 (holding, in a seriatim opinion, that “this being a private Act is to be taken literally,” but “North, Chief Justice, agreed that private Acts which go to one particular thing are
to be interpreted literally; but this statute extends to all bishops, and so may be taken according to equity; and therefore he, and Wyndham and Atkins, Justices, held the lease to be
good,” and a further note adding: “[b]ut this case was argued when Vaughan was Chief Justice; and he, and Ellis, Justice, were of another opinion”).
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The jurisprudential rules I have just described were not invariable—
nothing is. For one thing, there was some blurring at the edges between the
public and private categories, and some kinds of statutes (like those establishing towns and cities) transitioned over time from one category to the other.98
And there was always the possibility that a lawyer or judge might argue that a
particular private act, like one establishing an important bank or accommodation, was so important to the public that it should get public-act treatment.99
For another, not all judges felt it was their place to alter the language of statutes
in the courtroom. In a South Carolina case in 1804, the court split 2-2, with half
of the judges eager to apply equitable interpretation to a public act to broaden
its terms, and the other half of the judges uncomfortable with broad, atextual
interpretation where the words of the statute were unambiguous. 100
But courts in every American jurisdiction did recognize the distinction between public and private acts. 101 And these rules describe the consistent jurisprudence of the nation’s most important jurisdictions, including Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia. 102 In other words, Marshall’s
state-court peers—the nation’s leading judges—followed these rules, including
the judges of the Supreme Court in Marshall’s home state. 103
98.

HARTOG, supra note 8, at 179-239; see Frug, supra note 8, at 677.

99.

See, e.g., Rogers v. Bradshaw, 20 Johns. 735, 742 (N.Y. 1823) (“Turnpike roads are, in point of
fact, the most public roads or highways that are known to exist, and, in point of law, they
are made entirely for public use . . . .”).
100. Marane v. Carroll, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 525, 527 (1804); see also Nichols v. Wells, 2 Ky. (Sneed)
255, 259 (1803) (“[I]n their judicial capacity [judges] are bound by settled rules of construction, and it is their duty to declare what the law is and not what it should have been.”).
101.

See Peterson, supra note 20, at 717.
102. Id. at 748-60.
103.

See, e.g., Dilliard v. Tomlinson, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 183, 211 (1810) (opinion of Roane, J.);
Browne v. Turberville, 6 Va. (2 Call) 390, 403 (1800) (opinion of Lyons, J.). Although John
Marshall’s style of statutory interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe he developed an idiosyncratic statutory-interpretation jurisprudence. See Manning, supra note 20
at 87, 89 (admitting that “the pre-Marshall Court jurisprudence is largely inconclusive,” but
ﬁnding that “[d]uring the Marshall Court, a more deﬁnite interpretive approach began to
emerge in relation to the rules of statutory interpretation”); John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall’s Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1615-16
(1992) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall took disparate strains in the eighteenth-century
jurisprudence of statutory interpretation and crafted a new, text-focused method designed
to shield the Court from politics). His divergence from his peers is likely due to the superior
institutional competence of Congress as compared to the state legislatures, and to the political risks of an atextual statutory interpretation in plain view of his legally savvy political adversaries in successive Republican congressional majorities. That he nevertheless understood
the distinctions between public and private acts and their interpretive consequences is obvious from his handling of the private acts at issue in Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College
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E. These Rules Describe Two Paradigms of Interpretation with Broader
Applications in Founding-Era Jurisprudence.
These distinct paradigms of interpretation applied more broadly than the
statutory-interpretation context. I refer throughout this Article to the “privateact analogy” and the “public-act analogy,” but this is shorthand. It makes sense
to explain paradigms of interpretation using the distinction between public and
private legislation because arguments over a statute’s categorization were
standard in any early American lawyer’s practice. Lawyers arguing over the interpretive principles applicable to the Constitution must have relied on their
experience making similar arguments in run-of-the-mill domestic litigation.
But these paradigms also explain the Founders’ approaches to interpretation in
other contexts. And in these other contexts, the choice between broad and strict
interpretative methodologies was often based on a judgment about whether the
legal instrument in question represented an exercise of sovereign authority,
which courts should make as effective and as rational as possible, or a delegation
or “abandonment” of sovereign authority, the extent and details of which
“ought not to be presumed.” 104
In treaties, sovereigns delegate or limit their own sovereignty in certain
ways. The Founders therefore ﬁt treaties into the category of legal instruments
requiring what I am calling private-act interpretation. In Ware v. Hylton, an
important early treaty case, the ﬁrst Supreme Court urged that the “intention
of the framers of the treaty, must be collected from a view of the whole instrument, and from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or
from probable or rational conjectures.” 105 And, “[i]f the words express the
meaning of the parties plainly, distinctly, and perfectly, there ought to be no
other means of interpretation.” 106 Strict-construction advocates like St. George
Tucker compared the Constitution to a treaty to justify this paradigm of interpretation, what I am calling the “private-act analogy.” Tucker made this comparison while citing Vattel’s Law of Nations for the rule that sovereigns are presumed to have retained all sovereign powers not expressly delegated away.107
and from his reliance on public-act interpretive principles in other contexts. See infra Part
III.
104. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,
584, 650 (1837).
105. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796).
106.
107.

Id.
See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS bk. I ch. 2 § 16 (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758); 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL
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Note that this presumption against the derogation of sovereign power is the
same principle the Taney Court cited in the Charles River Bridge case to explain
why a private act must be narrowly construed. 108 The overlap between the rules
of interpretation applicable to legal instruments in this broad category could be
explicit: a case interpreting a treaty might refer to rules of construction for “a
law, treaty, or contract” in one breath. 109
This Article uses “private-act analogy” as its shorthand even though, in
some ways, “treaty” might seem a closer ﬁt for the compact theorist’s preferred
interpretive methodology, especially considering their argument that the Constitution was an agreement that appointed no neutral arbiter among its sovereign parties. “Treaty” also has the attractive quality that it was terminology
these theorists themselves used. 110 This Article nevertheless uses “private act”
as its shorthand for the paradigm of interpretation Jefferson advocated because
the goal here is to uncover and explain interpretive conventions that formed
building blocks of Founding-era jurisprudence. The rules of statutory interpretation are a better tool for this task, because they were better developed and
provide a clear view of what each side in the early American debate over constitutional interpretation was trying to accomplish. Courts had applied a uniform
and coherent methodology to private-act interpretation through decades of uncontroversial litigation, while facing no urgent political pressure to produce
particular outcomes. 111
A long, consistent practice of statutory interpretation meant that the conventions applicable to types of legislation were on the tip of the tongue for a
lawyer of this era. Furthermore, because of its details, the private-act analogy is
more helpful for discerning the metes and bounds of the broader paradigm
than a focus on treaty interpretation would be. It is less clear how the law of
treaty interpretation would value the recollections of treaty negotiators, in conGOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. 151
(The Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) (citing DE VATTEL, supra, at bk. II, ch. 17, §§ 305, 308
(describing the need to narrowly construe “objectionable” delegations of sovereign power)).
108. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 584, 650.
109.

See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 89-90 (1823); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446-51 (1987) (quoting authorities using the term
“treaty”).
110. See Amar, supra note 109, at 1453 (asserting that Jefferson’s “interpretive strategy” was to
suggest that the Constitution, as a compact, must be “strictly construed, in accordance with
the traditional rule that treaties generally be interpreted narrowly”).
111.

Like private acts, treaties were usually strictly construed. Still, facing a diﬃcult situation in
Schooner Peggy, Chief Justice Marshall analogized a treaty to public legislation and interpreted the text practicably. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 108-110
(1801).
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trast to the treatment of legislative history in the methodology applicable to
private legislation. Nor would it make as much sense to use the treaty analogy
to suggest, as some of the compact theorists did, that Federalist arguments
amounted to a fraud of the type that risked voiding the law. 112
That said, I would not like my reader to be distracted by the choice of nomenclature here. 113 This Article contrasts two broad categories of legal instruments and applicable interpretive paradigms, of which public and private legislation are two examples. The question, always, was not whether the
Constitution was a public or private act, but which kind of law provided the
best analogy, and therefore which paradigm of interpretation was most appropriate. A distinction between these two paradigms of interpretation—between
interpretation appropriate for “the general law of the land” 114 or interpretation
appropriate for a “compact,” 115 a word they sometimes used to describe private
acts—would become relevant for the Founding generation’s interpretation of
the Federal Constitution. Just as in litigation over the characterization of statutes, those with different views of federal power devoted their energies to a
battle over how the Federal Constitution ought to be characterized. That is because under the jurisprudence of their time, the categorization of written law
dictated a suite of case-determinative interpretive tools and choices.
ii. the invention of strict construc tion
Hagiographies of the great Chief Justice Marshall assume that he took
oﬃce before any major interpretations of the Constitution had been offered,
and suggest that part of his greatness was that he wrote in clean lines on a
blank slate. In fact, Marshall did not have that luxury. Familiar as it was to the
Founding generation, it should come as no surprise that the distinction between public and private legislation with its attendant methodological ramiﬁcations underlay the formative debates over the Constitution.

112.

See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 366 (1819) (the State’s advocate
contending that an expansive interpretation would perpetrate a fraud on “the people, who
were lulled into conﬁdence, by the assurances of its advocates, that [the Constitution] contained no latent ambiguity”). Of course, the secessionist impulse seems very in line with the
behavior of the jilted party in a breached treaty, but serious talk of secession came only after
the period under discussion.

113.

To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It may very well be that to a statutoryinterpretation expert, everything begins to look like a statute.

114.

Jenkins v. President of Union Tpk. Rd., 1 Cai. Cas. 86, 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
In re St. Mary’s Church, 7 Serg. & Rawle 517, 559-60 (Pa. 1822).

115.
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During the Convention, James Madison worried that a mere compact
among states would leave the union fragile and the federal government weak.
He advocated for something that could claim the mantle of the “law of the
land” and, after the Convention, the Constitution’s Anti-Federalist opponents
attacked it on those terms. Both Madison and the Anti-Federalists seemed to
understand that the conventions of interpretation applicable to public legislation would apply to the new Constitution. But Madison soon came to regret
the public-act analogy he had helped to encourage. As the ﬁrst Congress debated the Bank of the United States in the shadow of petitions to abolish slavery,
he feared that a broad construction of the Constitution could produce a schism
between the Northern and Southern states that could threaten the young Republic in its infancy.
In his opposition to the bank proposal, Madison started to describe the
Constitution as a grant of limited authority and to reject the use of public-act
interpretive conventions. Madison committed to this position after Congress
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. As the federal government began to display
the vices of a monarchical system, Madison and Jefferson would argue that the
Constitution was a compact to which states had consented on speciﬁc terms
and from which they could withdraw. The description of the Constitution as a
compact among preexisting states made it more like private legislation, that is,
a limited delegation of power from a set of sovereigns. Proponents of compact
theory sometimes used the language of “treaty,” “federation,” or “contract,” but
the consistent legal ramiﬁcation of their argument was that the strict, textbased interpretive methodology of private-act statutory interpretation must
apply. It was this compact theory that would provide the counterpoint for Marshall’s nation-building jurisprudence.
A. By the People or by the States: Choosing Between Public and Private Framing
During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison rejected ratiﬁcation
procedures that would have made the new federal government into a mere
league or treaty. He explained that he “considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one founded on the people, to be the
true difference between a league or treaty, and a Constitution.” 116 And Madison
saw two important beneﬁts to making a “Constitution” rather than what Ellsworth called a “compact” “to which the States, by their Legislatures, make

116.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (emphasis omitted).
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themselves parties.” 117 The ﬁrst was that a compact made the union too contingent. “The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties,”
Madison explained, “is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties
frees the other parties from their engagements.” 118 If the Constitution were
more like a treaty among the states, a violation by any one of them would
throw the entire project into peril. “In the case of a union of people under one
constitution,” by contrast, an isolated breach would not undermine the fundamental law. 119
The second, related advantage was that a true constitution would bind legislatures as a mere compact could not. While “a law violating a treaty ratiﬁed by
a preexisting law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise
or perﬁdious one,” Madison explained, “[a] law violating a constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null &
void.” 120 Only a general law of this kind could support judicial review.
The Constitution’s Anti-Federalist opponents warned that these supposed
advantages contained the seeds of tyranny. The Constitution’s plan made
courts the ﬁnal arbiters of its meaning, and if the Constitution were interpreted
“according to the rules laid down for construing a law,” 121 its text would be
subject to broad “equitable construction.” 122 Article III, they worried, empowered judges “to explain the constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it,
without being conﬁned to the words or letter.” 123 “The constitution itself
strongly countenances such a mode of construction,” Brutus warned. 124 The
expansive wording of the preamble would encourage courts “to give such a
meaning to the various parts, as will best promote the accomplishment of the
end.” 125 Because only a wide “latitude of interpretation” would “most effectually promote the ends the constitution had in view,” it was anyone’s guess “how

117.

JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 413 (n.p., E.H. Scott ed., 1893)
(1840) (quoting Oliver Ellsworth).

118.

Id. at 416.
119. Id.
120.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 116, at 93.
121. Essays of Brutus, No. XI, N.Y. J. (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 417, 419 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
122. Id. at 421.
123.

Id. at 419. Brutus’s arguments and the Federalists’ response are discussed in detail in
Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1047-57.

124.

Essays of Brutus, No. XI, supra note 121, at 420-21.
Id. at 421.
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this manner of explaining the constitution will operate in practice.” 126 As AntiFederalists argued in the state-ratiﬁcation conventions, phrases like “necessary
and proper” and “general welfare” were so vague that they provided no practical limits to judicial or congressional construction. 127
The Federalist response was not exactly a denial. The federal courts would
have no “greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of
every State,” said Hamilton—cold comfort for the critics, given the latitude we
have seen those courts possessed. 128 And while Hamilton urged that “there is
not a syllable in the plan under consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the
national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution,”
he admitted “that the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for
the laws.” 129
During the ﬁrst session of the ﬁrst term of Congress, Madison also assumed that the Constitution would be subject to broad construction. Madison
agreed with the Anti-Federalist view that the enumeration of Congress’s powers could not, by itself, impose any meaningful restraints. When he explained
the utility of a Bill of Rights in June 1789, he said that while “it is true” that the
powers of the federal government “are directed to particular objects,” the Constitution had still created a government of very broad power. 130 “[E]ven if
Government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with
respect to the means, which may admit of abuse,” because the “Necessary and

126.

Id.
See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, No. I, N.Y. J. (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 121, at 363, 367 (“The powers given by” the Necessary and Proper
Clause “are very general and comprehensive, and it may receive a construction to justify the
passing almost any law”); see also GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 121, at 11, 13 (detailing Mason’s objections to the Constitution); 4
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 55-56 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, D.C. Jonathan Elliot 1836) (quoting
Timothy Bloodworth’s objections to Congress’s power over elections) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S
DEBATES]; ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 136-39 (quoting Samuel Spencer’s objections to the
broad jurisdiction of the federal courts); ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra, at 71 (quoting John
Steele’s objections).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Avalon Project ed., 2008), AVALON PROJECT,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed81.asp [https://perma.cc/T5MH-9L6T].
129. Id.
127.

130.

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., perm. ed. 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison).
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Proper” Clause “enables” Congress “to fulﬁl every purpose for which the Government was established.” 131
Madison’s 1789 belief that the Constitution imposed no limits on the means
Congress could employ to pursue the ends enumerated in Article I is the very
opposite of the position he would take during discussion of the First Bank Bill
two years later, and indeed, his position on constitutional interpretation during
his presidency. In comments on the Bill of Rights in 1789, he explained that because the decision as to what was necessary and proper was “for them to
judge,” Congress had the power to decide that “general warrants,” or some other abusive course of action, were “necessary to collect the revenue.” 132 A Bill of
Rights, he explained, would place some outer limits on Congress’s choice of the
means it might use to effectuate its enumerated powers, limits that Madison
seems to have then believed were not already intrinsic to the plan of government.
But some of the concerns of the Constitution’s critics would begin to trouble Madison. William Smith, a delegate to South Carolina’s ratiﬁcation convention, urged that the Tenth Amendment be revised to say that “powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 133 Including the word “expressly,” he hoped, would rein in Congress’s “powers not delegated by [the] Const[itutio]n.,” and “go a great way in preventing Congress
from interfering with our negroes.” 134 “[O]therwise” Congress “may even
within the 20 years by a strained construction of some power embarrass us very
much.” 135 The word “expressly” did not make it into the ﬁnal draft. And it soon
became clear that Smith had been right to worry. 136 The ﬁrst Congress received
a petition from Benjamin Franklin, as president of the Pennsylvania Society for
the Abolition of Slavery, that advanced a broad, purpose-directed interpretation
of the Constitution. The abolitionists read the Constitution’s preamble to vest
Congress with “many important & salutary Powers” for “promoting the Wel-

131.
132.

Id.
Id.

133.

Letter from William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge (Aug. 10, 1789) (emphasis added), in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 273, 273 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991).
134. Id.
135.
136.

Id.
See generally SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING (2018) (arguing the Constitution created a governmental structure that
enabled antislavery forces to defeat slave interests).
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fare & securing the blessings of liberty to the People of the United States.” 137
The petition urged “that these blessings ought rightfully to be administered,
without distinction of Colour, to all descriptions of People,” and that therefore
Congress ought to “[s]tep to the very verge of [its] Powers” to stop “every Species of Traﬃck in the Persons of our fellow Men.” 138
While some Congressmen objected to reading this petition on the grounds
that it urged an unconstitutional measure, others were in favor. One congressman mused that “[p]erhaps in our Legislative capacity, we can go no further
than to impose a duty of ten dollars” 139 on the importation of slaves, so as to
make it less proﬁtable. But he believed that Article III courts were not as limited as Congress. “I do not know how far I might go, if I was one of the Judges
of the United States, and those people were to come before me and claim their
emancipation . . . .” 140 He added, “I am sure I would go as far as I could.” 141 A
Southern congressman growled in response that he “believe[d] his judgement
would be of short duration in Georgia,” and that “perhaps even the existence of
such a Judge might be in danger.” 142
B. The Bank of the United States and the Emergence of the Private-Act Analogy
It was in this context that the ﬁrst arguments over the Constitution’s categorization emerged. In early 1791, in the third session of that same term, Congress considered the constitutionality of a bill to establish the First Bank of the
United States. It was there that James Madison debuted what would be an enduring set of arguments for strict construction. Between the ﬁrst and the third
sessions of that term, the transformation of Madison’s views on how the Constitution should be interpreted could hardly have been more dramatic. Alexander Hamilton would counter with an eloquent defense of purpose-directed interpretation.
The abolitionist petitions had established the true stakes of the Bank Bill.
To admit that Congress had the power to establish a bank was to admit that the
Constitution invited broad interpretation—broad enough, perhaps, to threaten
137.

Petition from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, February 3, 1790, in 2 A NECESSARY EVIL?
SLAVERY AND THE DEBATE OVER THE CONSTITUTION 212, 212 (John P. Kaminski ed., 1995)
(emphasis omitted).
138. Id. (emphasis omitted).
139.

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1242 (1790) (statement of Rep. Scott).
140. Id.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. (statement of Rep. Jackson).
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Southern slavery. That is why the question of interpretive methodology was at
least as important to the combatants in the bank debate as their substantive
dispute over the bill. And it may be why voting on the bill split along sectional
lines, with nineteen of the twenty House votes against the bank from Southern
states. 143
Madison began his attack on the Bank Bill with the textual arguments advanced by its supporters. These readings, he contended, “destroy[ed]” what he
called “the essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited
and enumerated powers.” 144 The General Welfare Clause was meant for raising
taxes and could not justify establishing a bank. Nor could the Necessary and
Proper Clause “give an unlimited discretion to Congress.” 145 And “the preamble
to the Constitution,” in setting out broad purposes, seemed to have “produced
a new mine of power” in contravention of rules discouraging the use of prefatory language “for such a purpose.” 146
But Madison’s arguments went beyond the Constitution’s words. He
pressed a theory of constitutional interpretation that closely tracked the framework used for private legislation. Madison described the Constitution as “a
grant of particular powers only” that entailed certain “rules” for its “right interpretation.” 147 Like a lawyer in a case over a private act, he urged that the
“meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.” 148 Accordingly, he read selections from the ratiﬁcation debates to show that the state conventions had expected the Constitution
to grant limited and well-deﬁned powers. And just as though he were arguing
over a private act, he referred to its legislative history, recalling “that a power to
grant charters of incorporation had been proposed to the general convention
and rejected.” 149 Congress’s incorporation of the Northwest Territory, he said,
uncomfortably, should not weigh against this perspective because it “was a case
sui generis, and therefore cannot be cited with propriety.” 150

143.

This insight is from John Mikhail, Fixing Implied Powers in the Founding Era, 34 CONST.
COMMENT. 507, 515 (2019) (reviewing JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA (2018)).
144. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791).
145.

Id. at 1946.
146. Id. at 2009 (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 8, 1791).
147.

Id. at 1945 (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791).
148. Id. at 1946.
149.
150.

Id. at 1945.
Id. at 2011 (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 8, 1791).
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Madison pressed his theme, warning that incorporating a bank required an
unacceptable “latitude of interpretation.” 151 “[T]he doctrine of implication is
always a tender one,” 152 he argued, and something as fundamental as congressional authority could not be “deduced by implication.” 153 Madison did not
shrink from the consequences of his theory: “Had the power of making treaties . . . been omitted, however necessary it might have been,” he argued, “the
defect could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the
Constitution.” 154 If this bill were possible, he said, Congress’s power could
“reach every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of political economy.” 155 No one listening could have failed to think of slavery when
he warned that the Bank Bill “establishes a precedent of interpretation, levelling
all the barriers which limit the powers of the General Government, and protect
those of the State Governments.” 156
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson attached a copy of Madison’s speech to
his formal opinion of counsel recommending that President Washington veto
the Bank Bill after it passed in Congress. In that opinion, Jefferson warned
Washington that a principle was at stake that went beyond the bank issue: “To
take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless ﬁeld of power, no longer
susceptible of any deﬁnition.” 157 Jefferson argued that “the Constitution allows
only the means which are ‘necessary,’ not those which are merely ‘convenient,’”
and that “[i]f such a latitude of construction be allowed to this phrase as to give
any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one, for there is not one which
ingenuity may not torture into a convenience in some instance or other.” 158
In his reply, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton opposed what
amounted to a private-act analogy with arguments that clearly envisioned the
Constitution as a public act, subject to expansive principles of interpretation. It
was here that Hamilton developed the interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause that Marshall would invoke in McCulloch. A bank, Hamilton
contended, was merely the means of achieving some end. “If the end be clearly
151.

Id. at 1949 (statement of Rep. Madison, Feb. 2, 1791).

152.

Id. at 1948.
153. Id. at 1950.
154.

Id.
155. Id. at 1949.
156.

Id. at 1951.
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank
(Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 276 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
158. Id. at 278.
157.
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comprehended within any of the speciﬁed powers, & if the measure have an
obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of
the constitution—it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the
national authority.” 159 Hamilton’s “chief solicitude,” he said, arose “from a ﬁrm
persuasion, that principles of construction like those espoused by” Jefferson
“would be fatal to the just & indispensable authority of the United States.” 160
Instead, like any act written in service of the public welfare, it must be given a
broad interpretation. The “sound[er]” principle was “that the powers contained in a constitution of government, especially those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a country, its ﬁnances, trade, defence &c
ought to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good.” 161
Hamilton saw nothing in the nature of the federal government to render
the pro bono publico principle inapplicable. To say that this was a government of
enumerated powers, he argued “is nothing more than a consequence of this republican maxim, that all government is a delegation of power.” 162 The degree
of that delegation “is a question . . . to be made out by fair reasoning & construction, upon the particular provisions of the constitution—taking as guides
the general principles and general ends of government.” 163 Of course, “[t]he
moment the literal meaning is departed from, there is a chance of error and
abuse. And yet an adherence to the letter of its powers would at once arrest the
motions of the government.” 164 That liberal constructions left greater room for
error “may be a prudential reason for caution in practice,” he said, “but it cannot” dictate a “rule of restrictive interpretation.” 165
Hamilton also rejected Jefferson’s legislative-history claim that the power to
grant corporate charters had been considered and dropped by the Constitutional Convention. “[W]hatever may have been the intention of the framers of
a constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the instrument
itself, according to the usual & established rules of construction.” 166 After all,

159.

Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a
Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 107 (Harold C. Syrett,
Jacob E. Cooke, Jean G. Cooke, Cara-Louise Miller, Dorothy Twohig & Patricia Syrett eds.,
1965).
160. Id. at 97.
161.

Id. at 105.
162. Id. at 100.
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Id.
164. Id. at 106.
165.
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Id. at 111.
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“[n]othing is more common than for laws to express and effect, more or less
than, what was intended.” 167 The meaning was “deducible by fair inference
from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions of the constitution of
the United States,” and “arguments drawn from extrinsic circumstances, regarding the intention of the convention, must be rejected.” 168 In Hamilton’s
view, just as in a dispute over the meaning of a public act, the meaning of the
Constitution’s Framers did not matter.
C. The Alien and Sedition Acts and Compact Theory
Madison and Jefferson’s argument for strict construction took on new urgency with the Alien and Sedition Acts. These statutes, Republicans asserted,
undermined the basic ethic of republican government, replacing freedom of the
press, state-based authority, and friendliness to the immigrant with monarchical authoritarianism. To make matters worse, members of the federal judiciary behaved as though they were a part of the executive branch, seeking out
“sedition” even where local district attorneys failed to ﬁnd indictable offenses. 169 Their resort to private-act rules of construction was no longer just a clever stratagem to avoid conﬂict over slavery; the compact theory now offered a
rationale for state authority to interpret and enforce the Constitution at a time
when the federal government seemed out of control.
Madison and Jefferson wrote the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,
statements by each of those state legislatures rejecting the Alien and Sedition
Acts as a dangerous overreach. The Resolutions asserted that states, as parties
to a compact, had the right to interpret what the Constitution said and, if necessary, to repudiate what they saw as violations of that compact. Madison’s Virginia Resolutions began by urging that Virginia “views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact to which the states are
parties.” 170 Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolutions likewise explained that the Consti-

167.
168.
169.

170.

Id.
Id.
See JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 342-44 (1956) (discussing Justice Chase’s pursuit of Republican printers in Baltimore).
James Madison, Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
185, 189 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg, Jeanne K. Cross & Susan Holbrook Purdue eds.,
1991).
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tution was a “compact” made “for special purposes” and of “deﬁnite powers,” to
which “each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party.” 171
By casting the Constitution as a delegation of authority from existing sovereigns, the Resolutions suggested the ﬁtness of private-act rules of construction. Like powers conferred by legislative bargain, the federal government’s
powers were “limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact,” and its actions were “no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact.” 172 The Virginia Resolutions deprecated the tendency of the federal government “to enlarge its powers
by forced constructions of the constitutional charter which deﬁnes them,” particularly its “design to expound certain general phrases” broadly. 173 The “construction applied by the General Government” to the “General Welfare” and
“Necessary and Proper” Clauses, agreed the Kentucky Resolutions, “goes to the
destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the Constitution.”174
The language of the Constitution should be read narrowly, Jefferson argued. Its
“words” were “meant . . . to be subsiduary only to the execution of the limited
powers,” and “ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited
powers.” 175 The Constitution should instead be understood, Jefferson wrote,
“according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties.” 176
Interpreting the Constitution this way also meant that states were not
bound to accept acts they determined were unconstitutional. This point was
implicit in Madison’s statement for the State of Virginia, which denied the constitutionality of a Congressional statute and insisted that it was the state’s duty
to oppose it. The Kentucky Resolutions made this point explicit, arguing that
the federal “[g]overnment created by this compact was not made the exclusive
or ﬁnal judge of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its
discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers.” 177 Neither
Congress, nor the federal judiciary had ﬁnal say on what the law is. Instead, “as
in all other cases of compact among parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself” both whether there had been any “infrac171.

Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 550, 550 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003).

172.

Madison, supra note 170, at 189.
173. Id.
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Jefferson, supra note 171, at 552-53.
175. Id. at 553.
176.
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Id.
Id. at 550 (emphasis omitted).
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tions” of the Constitution and also the appropriate “mode and measure of redress.” 178
The Resolutions’ embrace of compact theory completed the emergence of a
strict-constructionist alternative to Federalist jurisprudence. It also represented
a dramatic about-face for Madison. Madison had understood the practical
differences between creating a Constitution subject to public-act interpretation
and creating a “compact.” He had helped choose a mode of ratiﬁcation that he
believed would lead to a public-act Constitution in order to opt into certain
beneﬁts, like judicial review, and in order to avoid the weaknesses of a “compact,” including the possibility of state nulliﬁcation. But what Madison must
have believed, if not during the debate over the Bank of the United States, then
certainly by the time he wrote the Virginia Resolutions in 1798, was that the
Convention had left him the leeway to change his position. He came to the
view that the choice he, along with the majority of the Convention, made to
ratify the Constitution through popular conventions, had not been written
back into the text of the Constitution itself. Therefore, the text remained open
to interpretation as either generally applicable law serving the public welfare or
a compact of enumerated powers.
In the Virginia Resolutions, Madison committed to the compact characterization and he derived a rule of strict construction from that premise. He
proffered the view that just as in a private act or treaty, the states had given up a
small, well-deﬁned portion of their sovereignty for certain expected beneﬁts.
Accordingly, the extent of the states’ grant must be construed against the
grantee. Republicans saw the election of 1800 as a ratiﬁcation of the position
that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions articulated. For the next two decades and more, the Resolutions would stand as the orthodox Republican position on constitutional interpretation.
Into the 1810s, public debate over the government’s powers under the Federal Constitution continued to demonstrate the centrality of the distinction between these public-act and private-act paradigms of interpretation. Because
members of Congress, as well as presidents, believed that it was their duty “in
the ﬁrst instance” to judge the constitutionality of the laws they debated before
voting, 179 arguments about interpretive principles cropped up in every important political controversy, whether or not the controversy made it into court
for resolution. Disputes over whether Congress could fund internal improvements turned on this, for example. An advocate of an internal-improvements
bill, urging a broad construction, rejected “reﬁned arguments on the Constitu178.
179.

Id. (emphasis added).
36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1297 (1820) (statement of Rep. Cushman).

42

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722302

expounding the constitution

tion,” an “instrument” that was “not intended as a thesis for the logician to exercise his ingenuity on.” 180 The Constitution should instead be “construed with
plain, good sense.” 181 Congress must have “constructive powers” under the
Constitution, said Henry Clay, the bill’s architect, as “[m]an and his language
are both imperfect.” 182 The Constitution was written for broad public purposes
and “we cannot foresee and provide speciﬁcally for all contingencies.” 183
James Pindall, one of a minority of Federalists from Virginia, explained that
men on each side of the question viewed the Constitution “in different and very
dissimilar aspects.” 184 “Whilst those” like himself “who aﬃrm our power to
construct roads consider the Constitution as a modiﬁcation of the social compact, deﬁning and conferring legislative powers,” he thought that “gentlemen
on the other side, who deny the power in question, seem to be out of humor
whenever the instrument is viewed in any other than its federative character, or,
as . . . a treaty between independent Powers.” 185 The “rules of interpretation, as
applied” to each of these “are different as to their latitude of operation” in that
“a treaty shall receive a more restrained construction, with regard to granted
powers.” 186
When he vetoed the bill authorizing internal improvements, President
Madison also rejected the broad construction of the Constitution it relied upon.
The power to fund improvements, Madison said, could not be derived from
the “General Welfare” clause. 187 Doing so “would have the effect of giving to
Congress a general power of legislation, instead of the deﬁned and limited one
hitherto understood to belong to them.” 188 Admitting this power, he believed,
required “an inadmissible latitude of construction.” 189 “[T]he permanent success of the Constitution depends on the deﬁnite partition of powers between
the General and State Governments,” and “no adequate landmarks would be
left by the constructive extension of the powers of Congress, as proposed in the

180.

30 ANNALS OF CONG. 855 (1817) (statement of Rep. Calhoun).

181.

Id.
32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1362 (1818) (statement of Rep. Clay).
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Id.
184. Id. at 1340 (statement of Rep. Pindall).
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30 ANNALS OF CONG. 212 (1817) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1) (veto message of
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bill.” 190 Madison’s successor, James Monroe, echoed this argument when he
took oﬃce shortly thereafter. And just as a judge would advise a party attempting a power beyond the scope of the limited grant in a private act, Monroe suggested “the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution.” 191 Only by
amendment would Congress achieve “the right in question.” 192
As in the controversy over the Bank Bill, slavery protectionism remained a
motivating force for those opponents of internal improvements who urged the
private-act analogy. North Carolina Senator Nathaniel Macon asked a fellow
North Carolinian to reconsider his support for internal improvements in these
terms: “I must ask you to examine the constitution of the U.S. . . . and then tell
me if Congress can establish banks, make roads and canals, whether they cannot free all the Slaves in the U.S.” 193 He asked his colleague to moderate his
“love of improvement” and “thirst for glory” with “sober discretion and sound
sense.” 194 Because legislation for internal improvements would only be possible
under the public-act analogy, there was no safe way to pursue it. “If Congress
can make canals, they can with more propriety emancipate.” 195
In the 1819 Missouri crisis as well, these familiar arguments about constitutional construction reemerged in the dispute over whether Congress had the
power to condition the admission of Missouri on an antislavery restriction. Of
course Congress could, said advocates of the restriction. They inferred Congress’s power to do so from “the language used in the preamble,” in which the
people “declare[d]” that they had “establish[ed] the Constitution” to “promote
the general welfare.” 196 This language clearly indicated that equitableinterpretation principles applied. Congress must construe the people’s “written
instructions, in the exercise of a sound discretion, applying general expressions
of [their] will to particular cases, and in adapting to exigencies, as they arise,
such measures as best comport with the known character of [their] Government.” 197 Only when Congress was “guided by [its] own judgement and discretion, enlightened and assisted” not only by the “letter” but by the “spir190.

Id.
191. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 18 (1817) (ﬁrst annual message of President Monroe).
192.

Id.; see also supra Section I.D (discussing the differing attitudes toward the possibility of legislative amendment in the private- and public-act interpretive paradigms).
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Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., Nathaniel Macon and the Southern Protest Against National Consolidation, 32 N.C. HIST. REV. 376, 380 (1955) (quoting Macon’s letters to Bartlett Yancey).
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it . . . of the Constitution,” along with “the wisdom of the ages and the jurisprudence of nations,” could the Constitution remain “competent not only to
ordinary, but to extraordinary exigencies.” 198 Instead of the stricter private-act
rule that would favor state power, therefore, “[i]n doubtful cases the construction ought to be in favor of the grantee.” 199 Only such broad constructions were
“adapted to give permanency and strength to the system.” 200
On the other side of the Missouri question, arguments for strict construction mingled with the broader conversation over the policy, economics, and
even the morality of slavery. Senator William Smith of South Carolina scoffed
at the idea that slavery was un-Christian, pointing out that the Old Testament
positively endorsed slavery and that Jesus Christ countenanced it. He accused
the antislavery contingent of “giv[ing] the Scriptures an implied construction,
as different from its literal sense, as they had that of the Constitution of the
United States.” 201 And he rejected the claim that “slavery is against the spirit of
the Christian religion,” asking, “[w]hen, and by what authority, were we
taught to separate the positive laws of God from the Christian religion?” 202 The
antislavery position amounted to “select[ing] such laws for our obedience as
we ﬁnd suited to our inclinations and our policy only, and abrogat[ing] the
others.” 203 He expressed a fervent hope that no priests “had given in to this ungodly opinion, that they could pare down the Old and New Testaments, so as
to make a convenient religion of them instead of an unerring one.” 204 With the
word “convenient,” he echoed Jefferson’s and Madison’s critiques of Hamilton’s
position on the First Bank of the United States. Jefferson had complained that
the Federalist interpretation of the Constitution transformed the “necessary
and proper” restriction on congressional power into a grant of any power that
is “merely ‘convenient.’” 205 This wording could not have been a coincidence in
1820, just after Marshall reasserted Hamilton’s original position in McCulloch v.
Maryland, and just after Marshall’s opinion suffered incisive criticism on this
point in the national press. 206

198.

Id. at 1296.

199.

Id. at 1297.
Id. (emphasis added).

200.
201.

35 ANNALS OF CONG. 270 (1820) (statement of Sen. Smith).
202. Id.
203.

Id.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205.
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Jefferson, supra note 157, at 278.
See infra Section III.C.

45

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3722302

the yale law journal

130:2

2020

As a lawyerly maneuver, these arguments about construction worked because they drew on a familiar distinction among categories of law that, in the
statutory-interpretation context, contained detailed, well-deﬁned sets of rules
for interpretation. Jefferson and Madison knew what they were doing when
they urged that the Constitution must be categorized as a “compact.” Hamilton
had made this move in his private practice and would have understood its implications.207 Indeed, so would any other lawyer of this era. The Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions represented an intellectually compelling interpretation of
the Federal Constitution, one against which Marshall would spend his whole
career writing. Marshall’s jurisprudence, asserting a public-act interpretation of
the Constitution, must be read in the context of this forceful private-act alternative.
iii. doctrinal implic ations : the marshal l court and
constitutional interpretation
John Marshall took oﬃce in 1801 in the midst of this heated debate, and it
would shape the leading constitutional decisions of his long tenure. As we have
seen, the question of how to characterize the Constitution was not only about
the scope of federal authority, but speciﬁcally about the role of federal courts in
national governance. If the Constitution were subject to private-act interpretive
rules, then judges applying it would be “mere machine[s]” totally lacking in
interpretive discretion. 208 But if the Federal Constitution were the “law of the
land”—that is, something akin to a public act, then judges would have a role to
play in molding federal authority to achieve its broad objectives.
One cannot understand the Marshall Court’s jurisprudence, or Marshall’s
efforts to establish the Court as a co-equal branch of a powerful national government, without this context. In its major cases, the Marshall Court committed to the position that the Constitution should be interpreted as though it
were public legislation. That is not to say that Marshall’s position emerged fully
formed with Marbury. The Court and Marshall himself evolved in response to a
changing political environment from a cautious beginning to a period of imperial expansion, followed ultimately by a notable retrenchment. This periodization of the Marshall Court, reﬂecting the ebb and ﬂow of the Court’s relationship to other powerful institutions, helps explain all of Marshall’s
jurisprudence. But it is particularly crucial to an account of his constitutional
207.

See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

208.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
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decisions because the Supreme Court’s main detractors and institutional competitors were committed to the private-act analogy.
A. Drawing the Lines of Battle: Marbury v. Madison
The Marshall Court would make its ﬁrst foray into the interpretive debate I
have described in Marbury v. Madison. 209 Coming as it did just after the Republican ascendancy in the executive and legislative branches, the Marbury case
posed more of a risk to the Court’s power than an opportunity. Yet in a case
about judicial authority under the Constitution, the Court could not altogether
avoid the question of how the Constitution should be characterized. In a peerless work of institutional diplomacy, Marshall acknowledged and answered
Jefferson’s anxieties about the public-law interpretation of the Constitution
while leaving room for the muscular public-law conception of the Constitution
the Court would embrace when more hospitable political conditions emerged a
decade later.
The conventional black-letter interpretation of Marbury as the work of an
imperial court establishing the power of judicial review ignores its historical
context. 210 The basic facts are familiar to any law student: the Judiciary Act of
1801 gave John Adams the opportunity to appoint a slew of judicial oﬃcers and
judges on the eve of Jefferson’s inauguration. These “midnight appointments”
were made with such haste that some of the commissions remained undelivered when Jefferson took oﬃce. Jefferson instructed his Secretary of State,
James Madison, not to deliver them, effectively depriving the appointees of
their jobs. Marbury, one of the midnight appointees, petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the administration to deliver his commission.211 But that is not all.
Marbury arose at a time when the Court found itself under attack from the
executive and legislative branches. Jefferson, who only a few years earlier had
written the Kentucky Resolutions with their strict private-act reading of the
Constitution, joined hostility to Marshall’s politics with personal dislike. A new
Republican majority in Congress began a campaign to purge Adams’s Federalist judicial appointees. Amid heated debates over efforts to repeal the 1801 Judi209.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

210.

See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING
SHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 189 (2005);

FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARAkhil Reed Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445
(1989); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 18 DUKE L.J. 1, 1
(1969).
211. See Van Alstyne, supra note 210, at 3-6.
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ciary Act, Federalists warned Republicans that the Supreme Court could strike
down their proposed legislation. Republicans responded by threatening to impeach any judge who tried. Some Republicans went so far as to advocate a constitutional amendment to limit federal judges’ tenure and provide for their appointment and removal by the legislature. 212 When the repeal legislation
passed, it included a provision canceling the next two Supreme Court sittings
in an effort to deny Marshall’s Court the opportunity to review the bill before it
went into effect. 213
Unsurprisingly, when the Court ﬁnally met to consider Marbury, Marshall
was eager to avoid confrontation with Congress and the executive branch. Indeed, the most-remembered words of his opinion, that it is “emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” was not
the bold declaration of interpretive supremacy we read into it today.214 Rather,
it explained why Marshall could not simply exercise the mandamus authority
set out in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to give Marbury his commission. He meant
to establish no more than that the “courts, as well as other departments,” are
bound to consider and respect the limits of the Constitution notwithstanding
contrary legislation. 215 And Marshall concluded that the Act’s grant of mandamus authority was unconstitutional.
Marbury was a balancing act—more a piece of political advocacy than a legal ruling. Its major accomplishment was that it shielded the federal judiciary
from the political fallout of the election of 1800. Along the way, Marshall was
careful to pay tribute to each of America’s warring factions: he soothed the Federalists by castigating President Jefferson’s actions as illegal and unjust, while
also reassuring Jefferson that the Court was powerless to stop him. This was
the jurisprudence of self-preservation. Jefferson may not have liked the opinion—he would, a few years later, irascibly instruct his Attorney General to
“stop citing that case as authority.” 216 But as the opinion did not actually command or enjoin any action—as it failed to do anything—Jefferson was able to
ignore it.

212.

See RICHARD E. ELLIS,
PUBLIC 41-45 (1971).

213.

Compare Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156, 156 (repealed 1826), with Judiciary Act
of 1801, ch. 4, § 1, 2 Stat. 89, 89 (repealed 1802).

214.

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
Id. at 180 (emphasis added).

215.
216.
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See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS,
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The opinion also showed Marshall walking the line between the public-act
and private-act interpretations of the Constitution that Jefferson and Hamilton
had so ably asserted. Jefferson’s early view of the Constitution imposed extreme
limits on federal government. In 1798, Jefferson explained that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were unconstitutional in part because he thought Congress could
not deﬁne crimes not expressly listed in the Constitution without an amendment. 217 His view of the Constitution as a “compact” dictated this stringency,
in line with well-established rules for interpreting private legislation. These
views also accorded with his long-held mistrust of judicial discretion even in
the context of public-act interpretation. He once said that to “relieve the judges
from the rigour of the text, and permit them, with pretorian discretion, to
wander into its equity,” risked making “the whole legal system . . . incertain.” 218
And he particularly deprecated Lord Mansﬁeld, whose “seducing eloquence”
had managed “to persuade the [English] courts of Common law to revive the
practice of construing their text equitably.” 219 While Jefferson moderated his
position after winning the presidency, these earlier views maintained their adherents, particularly among politically powerful Republicans from Virginia.
These views on the role of courts and the nature of the Constitution could
not place Jeffersonians further from the arch-Federalist Hamilton’s position
that the Constitution, as the “law of the land,” must be interpreted like other
public acts. Where Jefferson deprecated Mansﬁeld, Hamilton profoundly admired his brand of equitable interpretation.220 In Hamilton’s view, judges must
interpret the Constitution to effectuate their understanding of the “general
principles and general ends of governments,” restricted only by their own
“pruden[ce]” and “caution.” 221 Stripped of its throat-clearing caveats and subtlety, equitable interpretation of public statutes often amounted to an opportunity for judges to play a role in governance. Applied to the Constitution, it

217.

Jefferson, supra note 171, at 550-51.
218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 28, 1785), reprinted in 9 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 67, 71 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954).
219. Id.
220.

3 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 92-93 (Julius Goebel, Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds., 1980). Hamilton thought of Lord Mansﬁeld as a
man of “profound learning, clear intellect, and admirable judgement,” as well as “wisdom
and purity,” who, having “adorned the jurisprudence of England,” deserved “the reverence of
his own age” and “the admiration of posterity.” Id.
221. Hamilton, supra note 159, at 100. Additionally, for an example of a contemporaneous use of
equitable interpretation in the interpretation of public statutes, see Peterson, supra note 20,
at 714-15.
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would allow judges to avoid diﬃculties or seize opportunities the Constitutional Convention had failed to anticipate.
Part of the genius of Marshall’s Marbury opinion was that it reassured
Jeffersonians on this score. While praising Lord Mansﬁeld as a “very able
judge,” Marshall explained that American judges did not enjoy the same latitude as their British counterparts. The writ of mandamus, as Mansﬁeld deﬁned
it, was a tool to be deployed “upon reasons of justice[,] . . . upon reasons of
public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government,” and “upon all
occasions where the law has established no speciﬁc remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one.” 222 It belonged to a style of
judicial governance and latitude of discretion that Hamilton admired and
Jeffersonians feared. When Marshall quoted Lord Mansﬁeld’s description of
the writ and then explained how the Constitution barred him from exercising
the same powers, he signaled to Jefferson that his Court was safe. He signaled
that he would read the Constitution as a text that constrained discretion, rather
than inviting it, even where justice appeared to require a different result. In doing so, Marshall suggested—without making any promises—that there was
something to distinguish his view of the Constitution from Hamilton’s.
Marbury showed Marshall’s skill as a conciliator, a role he learned to play
during his formative experiences as a leading Federalist in Virginia. He tended
to argue about politics by seeking to assuage his opponents’ concerns rather
than questioning their premises. 223 This is what he was doing when he reassured Jeffersonians that he could not exercise the powers of a Lord Mansﬁeld.
This is what he was up to when he said that as a textual matter, as a matter of
constitutional restriction, he must decline the power to issue writs of mandamus that an earlier Congress had conferred on the Court. But Marbury did not
commit the Court to the position that the Constitution must be interpreted
strictly. And it stopped well short of rejecting equitable interpretation or Hamilton’s doctrine of implied powers.

222.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169 (1803) (quoting R v. Barker (1762) 97 Eng.
Rep. 823, 824-25; 3 Burr. 1265, 1266-67).
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See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 551-562 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, D.C., Jonathan Elliot
1836) (reproducing John Marshall’s speech in the Virginia ratifying convention arguing that
Anti-Federalists’ fears about federal judges were overblown because the judges would not
have undue power over the states). Chisolm v. Georgia would immediately refute one of the
points Marshall made in this speech. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 450-51, 466, 467, 479, 480
(1793), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI (restricting the ability
of nonresident individuals to sue a state in federal court).
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Marbury’s diﬃdence in the face of extraordinary political pressure contrasts
sharply with the full-throated endorsement of Hamilton’s public-law conception of the Constitution that the Marshall Court later offered in Martin and
McCulloch. The comparative boldness of the Court’s opinions of the 1810s reﬂected its partial rapprochement with more moderate Republicans in Congress
and the White House. It was a decade in which the Republican Party was broad
enough to contain opposites. In the 1810s, “Republican” still described states’
rights advocates like John Taylor of Caroline and John Randolph of Roanoke,
who could justly be called “more Jeffersonian than Jefferson.” 224 But it also described men like Albert Gallatin, the Bank of the United States’s biggest booster; Henry Clay, the advocate of internal improvements; and even a Hamiltonian nationalist like Justice Story. This new climate gave the Marshall Court
more leeway to assert its authority.
B. The Issue Joined: Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
The Marshall Court would make its ﬁrst explicit commitment to the Hamiltonian public-law interpretation of the Constitution in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee. 225 The case arose when the Virginia Supreme Court refused to follow a Supreme Court decision overturning its interpretation of a federal treaty. The
Virginia court issued seriatim opinions rejecting as unconstitutional the Supreme Court’s appellate review of state-court judgments. 226 In Martin, the
Marshall Court responded, reviewing and reversing the Virginia court once
again.
The political climate for a muscular defense of federal supremacy would
never be more favorable. The Court decided Martin in a period of increased
patriotic fervor following the War of 1812, as nationalists began to dominate
the leadership of the Republican Party in Congress, and just after New England
Federalists had earned national opprobrium for the states’ rights stance of their
Hartford Convention. But the Court’s strong opinion, taking advantage of a
temporary high-water mark in nationalistic sentiment at the federal level,
masked an enduring institutional vulnerability.
The nominal question in Martin—whether Virginia’s Supreme Court was
subject to the Federal Supreme Court’s authority—belied the political reality of

224.
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the time. The fact was that during this era, Virginia was a competitor, not an
inferior, jurisdiction. Virginia’s law, and especially the legal opinion its legislature issued in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, competed with the Supreme
Court’s for adherents. Justice Story’s opinion for the Court reﬂected that reality. Story did not answer Virginia’s deﬁance in a tone of exasperation; he answered it carefully and in detail, knowing he was speaking to an audience that
might be swayed to either side. While Story’s opinion is today taught as
though it established the principles he contended for,227 as a historical matter,
the institutional winner of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee is a closer call.
Justice Story’s opinion is familiar because it is often taught in constitutional-law courses, and because much of it remains good law. The Virginia opinion
Justice Story reversed is not, of course, on the modern law-school syllabus and
it is tempting to dismiss the Virginia court’s refusal to abide by the Supreme
Court’s mandate as states’ rights deﬁance. But this casts the Virginia Supreme
Court’s position as political rather than legal. In fact, Virginia’s interpretation of
the Constitution was dangerous to the Marshall Court precisely because it was
well reasoned and persuasive. Indeed, in terms of legal merit, it would be diﬃcult to choose between the two readings of the Constitution’s text and structure. What Martin made clear, therefore, was that the text of the Constitution
alone did not resolve whether it should be interpreted as though it were public
or private legislation.
The strength of Virginia’s legal reasoning is worth elaborating upon in
some detail. Virginia started with the undisputed premise that federal and state
governments had been established by different gatherings of “the people.” 228 As
a result, they existed as separate sovereigns, drawing on separate sources of legitimacy. The connections between these sovereigns, both positive and restrictive, were set out in detail in the Constitution’s text. That text, moreover, had
been capped with an interpretive instruction: the Tenth Amendment’s injunction that “powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved.” 229
The Virginia court read Article III with these principles in mind. It held
that Section 2, setting out the Supreme Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and
its appellate authority, could not be read in isolation from Section 1, which au-

227.

See, e.g., PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B.
SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 128 (5th ed. 2006) (“[T]he power
of the federal courts to review the judgments of state courts and the constitutionality of state
legislation has not been seriously questioned since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee . . . .”).
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thorized creation of lower federal courts. The appellate-jurisdiction provision
in Section 2, Virginia explained, conferred a power to review only the judgements of those courts in which Section 1 had vested the entire judicial power of
the United States. That meant that the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
extended only to cases that both concerned the subject matter listed and arose in
whatever lower federal courts Congress might choose to establish. Any alternative interpretation created an absurdity: the court of one sovereign commanding compliance of the courts of another sovereign. 230
Justice Story would counter in Martin that Article III, Section 2 committed
“all cases” involving federal law to the Supreme Court’s appellate authority,
without regard to the originating court. 231 But Virginia argued that this took
the words out of their context and, besides, proved too much. The courts of
France and Spain might have to interpret a federal statute to settle a contract
dispute between their own citizens over a federal land grant, for example. In a
case like that one, Story’s reading would justify appellate jurisdiction over the
courts of France or Spain. And while the states were not as separate from the
federal government as France and Spain, their connection to the federal government was deﬁned by the Constitution, which nowhere said that the Supreme Court could review the judgements of state courts. This was a document, Virginia reasoned, whose framers were explicit when they wanted to
abrogate state power—for example, in the long list of speciﬁc limitations on
states’ sovereignty in Article I, Section 10. It would be a violation of their oath
to uphold the Federal Constitution for Virginia’s judges to accept such a dramatic and unnecessary extension of federal power by implication. 232
Nor did the Virginians see any support for Justice Story’s reliance on the
Supremacy Clause. Virginia’s judges read the Clause to establish a rule of decision that required them to apply the Federal Constitution as they understood it.
They could not abdicate that duty by following a judgment which they thought
to be wrong. The Virginians agreed that their position risked inconsistent interpretations of federal law across the states. But this was a consequence of the
Framers’ design. The Framers, they reasoned, must have preferred the evil of
230.

In his seriatim opinion, Judge Cabell was sure that entering a judgment on remand from the
Supreme Court was no mere ministerial task. But if the Supreme Court could commandeer
state judges and direct them to perform judicial duties, it must be because, for those purposes, the state courts served as lower federal courts. This was something the Constitution
clearly did not contemplate. If nothing else, state-court judges could not carry out the duties
of federal judicial oﬃcers because they lacked the salary and tenure protections required by
Article III, Section 1. Id. at 15 (opinion of Cabell, J.).

231.
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inconsistent interpretations of federal law to the evils of centralized control.
And if that judgment proved unsound, the answer was a constitutional
amendment—not judicial interpretation that stripped power from the states in
violation of the text. 233
With Martin, the Supreme Court could no longer avoid taking a deﬁnitive
stance on the nature of the Constitution. The Virginia Supreme Court made it
clear that the debate over whether the Constitution was a private or public act
had important consequences for the Supreme Court’s institutional viability.
The Virginia court’s vision of the Constitution did not just limit the power of
Congress to legislate and the power of the President to enforce federal law. As
Virginia explained it, the theory also denied the Supreme Court’s authority to
interpret conclusively the only body of law within its purview. Instead, as when
a compact had pointed out “no common umpire,” the states themselves would
decide what the Constitution meant and whether its terms had been satisﬁed. 234
The very strength of Virginia’s legal reasoning compelled the Supreme
Court to issue a forceful response. Virginia’s opinion made it clear that in terms
of legal merit, the broad and narrow visions of federal power were in equipoise.
Because each was supported by persuasive readings of the Constitution’s text, a
choice between the two depended upon characterization. This characterization
might be drawn from the Constitution’s history, from the process of ratiﬁcation, or from prudential or philosophical considerations. But the case for the
ideal to which Marshall had committed his life—a strong and ﬂexible central
government supported by an authoritative Supreme Court—could not stand on
text and structure alone.
This is why each court’s opinion began with statements about whether the
Constitution was more like public or private law. Judge Spencer Roane of Virginia began by stating that the “powers of the federal government result from
the compact to which the states are parties,” and as such, “are no farther valid,
than as they are authorised by the grants enumerated in the compact.” 235 It was
true that the Supreme Court had reviewed state-court decisions a number of
times over the previous decade. But this precedent proved nothing. Roane recalled the man in Aesop’s fable who, as evidence of his superiority to a lion,
points to the statue of a lion being subdued by a man. If lions could sculpt, the
lion retorts, they would show themselves as the victors. 236 The Court’s jurisdic233.

Id. at 14 (opinion of Cabell, J.).
234. Id., at 29 (opinion of Roane, J.).
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tion over state-court judgments had “never received the solemn and deliberate
discussion and decision of that tribunal.” 237 It had instead been adopted “piecemeal,” “under a latitude of construction and discretion in the Court, which is at
war with the idea of limited and speciﬁed powers, in the general government.” 238
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Story rejected the idea that the
Constitution was an agreement among the states. He countered with his own
origin story: “The constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacities,” Story said, “but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the United
States.’” 239 The Constitution was “the voice of the whole American people solemnly declared”—in other words, the law of the land. 240
From this characterization, Story derived rules of construction. Like a public act, “[t]he constitution unavoidably deals in general language.” 241 “It did
not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute speciﬁcations of its powers, or to declare the means
by which those powers should be carried into execution.” 242 Instead, like other
public legislation, the Constitution was written with the expectation that judges would mold it as circumstances required. After all, “[i]t could not be foreseen what new changes and modiﬁcations of power might be indispensable to
effectuate” its “general objects.” 243 “The instrument,” Story insisted, “was not
intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure
through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.” 244 That is to say, it was a law designed for equitable interpretation. It was only “[w]ith these principles in view, principles in
respect to which no difference of opinion ought to be indulged,” that Story
could “proceed to the interpretation of the constitution, so far as regards the
great points in controversy.” 245
So eager was Justice Story to assert this point about principles of interpretation, he risked muddling his main argument. The speciﬁc question presented
237.
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was whether section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the section that said the
Supreme Court could review and reverse state-court decisions, was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power. In his introduction setting out the nature
of the Constitution and the interpretive principles that should apply, Story
suggested that section 25 was constitutional because the Constitution had been
broadly framed, “leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own
means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of
its powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require.” 246
This argument, that section 25 was constitutional because the Constitution
should be interpreted equitably, was somewhat in tension with the body of his
opinion. There, he urged that Supreme Court review of state-court decisions
was required by speciﬁc words in the Constitution, including Article III’s instruction that judicial power “shall be vested in one supreme court” and “shall
extend to all cases.” 247
C. The Public-Act Analogy Ascendant: McCulloch v. Maryland
Marshall, who had recused himself in Martin, 248 was eager to assert the
Court’s position on the characterization of the Constitution himself. He would
get his chance in 1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland, a case that arose from an
agreement between the Bank of the United States and Maryland, a state relatively friendly toward the bank. 249 The question the parties wanted tested was
whether Maryland’s relatively mild tax on bank notes was constitutional.
At least one historian has suggested that Marshall colluded with the parties
to get the case speedily before the Court, and may have intervened to “sharply
limit and skew the discussion of the constitutional issue.” 250 Before the argument, one of the government’s counsel wrote to another saying that he had intended to collaborate on a strategy for the argument but, “I now suppose it will
not be necessary, since it is said that little else than the thread bare topics connected with the constitutionality of the Bank will be introduced in to the argu-

246.
247.
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Id. at 327 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2).
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ment.” 251 The historian Richard Ellis believes that no one except Marshall
could have sent them that signal.252 On the Maryland side, no doubt was raised
about the Court’s authority to hear the appeal from a state court. Not only did
Maryland’s lawyers fail to mention the issue so hotly contested in Martin, the
state had already signaled its readiness to comply with whatever the Court decided. 253 Whether or not Marshall actually helped to construct this case, it is
clear that McCulloch would provide an unusually clean opportunity for him to
intervene into the debate over how the Constitution must be characterized.
Counsel on each side cued up the question. Maryland’s counsel “insisted[]
that the constitution was formed and adopted, not by the people of the United
States at large, but by the people of the respective states.” 254 The Constitution
was, “therefore, a compact between the states.” 255 As such, the Convention
crafted the Constitution with “the utmost precision and accuracy,” and it was
only ratiﬁed on the assurance “that it contained no latent ambiguity, but was to
be limited to the literal terms of the grant.” 256 The appropriate rule of construction, “the only safe rule,” as with all private legislation, “is, the plain letter of
the constitution; the rule which the constitutional legislators themselves have
prescribed in the 10th amendment.” 257 Following that rule, counsel for Maryland found that “[t]he power of establishing corporations is not delegated to
the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states. It is, therefore, reserved to the states, or to the people.” 258 And as with any private act, a court
could not construe a remedy if the plain text proved inadequate. If there was an
“anomaly” or “imperfection,” “neither congress, nor this court, can correct
it.” 259 The Constitution was like a legislative bargain, a “system . . . established
by reciprocal concessions and compromises” that could only be remedied
through the amendment process. 260
For their part, the lawyers for the Bank dutifully made the case that the
Constitution was more like a public law by insisting that it “acts . . . by means

251.
252.
253.
254.

ELLIS, supra note 249, at 76.
Id.
Id. at 72, 74.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 363 (1819) (argument of Mr. Jones).

255.

Id.
256. Id. at 366.
257.

Id. at 374 (argument of Mr. Martin).
258. Id.
259.
260.

Id. at 371 (argument of Mr. Jones).
Id.
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of powers communicated directly from the people.” 261 It could not be a compact, they maintained, as “[n]o state, in its corporate capacity, ratiﬁed it,” and
“[t]he state sovereignties” were not its “authors.” 262 Indeed, that was the point:
the central “vice” of the Articles of Confederation, “which the new constitution
was intended to reform,” was that it dealt with “sovereign states in their corporate capacity.” 263 And if this was the mischief the Constitution was intended to
redress, it must be interpreted to have ﬁxed that problem, not to have prolonged it. Because the Constitution was meant as an expression of the superior
sovereignty of the people themselves, the powers it conferred on the federal
government should be construed to include all of “the means of giving [them]
eﬃcacy,” so long as the means were “ﬁtted to promote . . . the objects of that
government.” 264
This analogy to public legislation, with its express appeal to the purposedriven latitude of equitable interpretation, underlay all of the Bank’s arguments. Equitable interpretation allowed judges to sometimes ignore, contradict, or go beyond the text in order to effectuate the “spirit” of a public law.
Likewise, many of the government’s points were not so much arguments from
the text as they were arguments about the irrelevance of the text. “These words,
‘necessary and proper,’ in such an instrument, are probably to be considered as
synonymous,” said Daniel Webster. 265 Not only was it surplusage to have used
both words, he implied that it was gratuitous to have included either. “Even
without the aid” of that clause, “the grant of powers itself necessarily implies
the grant of all usual and suitable means for the[ir] execution.” 266 Webster’s cocounsel William Pinkney made a similar argument about the Supremacy
Clause. Although the Constitution had declared both Congress’s powers and
“the means of executing them” “to be the supreme law of the land,” an explicit
statement of federal supremacy was unnecessary because it was already dictated
by logic, by history, and by the nature of the instrument. 267 The powers of the
federal government “must be supreme, or they would be nothing,” and so “they
would have been such, without the insertion of this declaratory clause.” 268

261.
262.

Id. at 377 (argument of Mr. Pinkney).
Id.

263.

Id.
264. Id. at 378.
265.

Id. at 324 (argument of Mr. Webster).
266. Id. at 323-24.
267.
268.

Id. at 378 (argument of Mr. Pinkney).
Id.
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The lawyers also made arguments that relied on the Constitution’s silence.
Given the broad interpretive principles applicable to a law like the Constitution, Pinkney explained:
[A]n express authority to erect corporations generally, would have been
perilous; since it might have been constructively extended to the creation of corporations entirely unnecessary to carry into effect the other
powers granted . . . . The grant of an authority to erect certain corporations, might have been equally dangerous, by omitting to provide for
others, which time and experience might show to be equally, and even
more necessary. 269
By instead avoiding any reference to corporations altogether, the Convention
made clear that Congress could charter whatever corporations were necessary
to effectuate its broad enumerated powers.
The Attorney General made an argument in this same genre. Establishing a
banking corporation is only a means to an end, and “an enumeration of this
particular class of means, omitting all others, would have been a useless
anomaly in the constitution,” an instrument whose “whole plan” was marked
by “simplicity.” 270 The breadth of the Constitution’s purposes required a simple
text with few details. And a simply written law with broad public purposes
must be interpreted as all public law, that is, equitably and ﬂexibly to effectuate
those purposes. And so the Constitution’s omission of such details as a national
bank only added to the proof that Congress had the right to go into banking, if
it so chose.
To the modern reader expecting a case about a tax on bank notes, these arguments about the nature of the Constitution may seem disorienting. We enter
the scene like a third party entering the kitchen just as a quarrelling couple is
trying to decide on breakfast. What will be clear, to even the most hapless
houseguest, is that eggs are not the only thing under discussion. Why wasn’t
McCulloch just a dispute over the degree of ﬁt required between the ends enumerated in the Constitution and the means the government can use to reach
them? Why was it necessary to go all the way back to the framing of the Constitution and ask whether the states preceded or followed the Union? It was
necessary because the debate over whether the Constitution was more like public or private law was latent in every case involving constitutional interpretation.
269.
270.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 357-58 (argument of Mr. Wirt).
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This is the critical context for McCulloch v. Maryland. Without it, and without understanding the interpretive principles derived from each position, the
opinion and arguments of counsel make for odd reading. Although the Bank
provided the occasion, any argument about the relative power of the federal
and state governments necessarily brought in all of the themes and anxieties of
the ongoing debate over characterization. And because that debate proposed
incompatible rules of construction, the Court could not discuss the meaning of
a single word in the Constitution without exhuming and reanimating the entire argument.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch shows signs of haste. Its best
arguments were borrowed from Hamilton, who had devised the “[l]et the end
be legitimate” formulation; 271 and from Daniel Webster, who came up with the
hyperbolic but catchy aphorism that the “power to tax [is] the power to destroy.” 272 Chief Justice Marshall’s best textual point—that the Framers had used
the phrase “absolutely necessary” in Article I, Section 10 to indicate a stricter
rule and that therefore the word “necessary” in “necessary and proper” should
be construed more loosely—also came from counsel. 273 Even poetic language,
like the lovely turn of phrase in his warning that a constitution too strictly construed would be reduced to “a splendid bauble,” was, at the time, a cliché. 274
The McCulloch opinion also passed by some of Maryland’s best points
without acknowledgment. Chief Justice Marshall never said why it was “necessary” to establish branches of the national Bank in states that didn’t want

271.

See Hamilton, supra note 159, at 107 (“If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the
speciﬁed powers, & if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden
by any particular provision of the constitution—it may safely be deemed to come within the
compass of the national authority.”).

272.

See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421 (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 327 (argument of Mr. Webster).

273.

Id. at 413-14 (Marshall, C.J.) (borrowing language from Mr. Wirt, see id. at 354-55).
Id. at 421. The word “bauble” was often called into action to describe the trappings of monarchy. See, e.g., Lines Occasioned by Reading Mr. Paine’s Rights of Man, DAILY ADVERTISER
(N.Y.), May 27, 1791, at 2 (“With what contempt must every eye look down, / On that base
childish bauble, call’d a crown.”); On Our Interior Relations, ALB. GAZETTE & DAILY ADVERTISER, Nov. 3, 1817, at 2 (“A crown is but a glittering bauble; it is the tyranny which it so
often covers, that renders it opprobrious.”). But the word was also used to dismiss other objects or honors as all ﬂash, no substance. See, e.g., AEDANUS BURKE, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE
SOCIETY OR ORDER OF CINCINNATI (1783), reprinted in INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Bos.), Feb. 5, 1784, at 1 (“But in support of the order [of the Cincinnati], it will be
alledged, that the states cannot pay the army, the oﬃcers will be contented with this bauble . . . . ‘’Tis like throwing a tub to a whale,’ say they.”).

274.
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them. 275 He never answered the observation that, if the power to establish a
bank was implicit in the text, then many of Congress’s enumerated powers
could also have been left to implication. For instance, the power to levy war
must include the power to raise an army, and to levy taxes and borrow money
for that purpose. Yet the Constitution spelled out each of these powers. “If,
then, the convention has speciﬁed some powers, which being only means to accomplish the ends of government, might have been taken by implication; by
what just rule of construction, are other sovereign powers, equally vast and important, to be assumed by implication?” 276 Marshall didn’t say. For some of
Maryland’s other arguments, the Chief Justice vanquished only a paper-tiger
version, leaving the harder question unanswered. 277
Marshall answered other arguments directly, but badly. For instance, Maryland’s strongest argument may have been that Article I, Section 10 explicitly restricts states from taxing imports or exports or laying duties on tonnage. That,
Maryland insisted, was “the whole restriction, or limitation, attempted to be
imposed by the constitution, on the power of the states to raise revenue.” 278
This explicit prohibition, combined with the Tenth Amendment’s instruction
that powers not “prohibited . . . to the States, are reserved to the States,” meant
that states’ “power of taxation is absolutely unlimited in every other respect.” 279
Furthermore, records from the ratiﬁcation debates showed that the issue of
state taxation was much debated and that “the states would not have adopted
the constitution, upon any other understanding.” 280 To this very good argument, Marshall made the rather lame reply that Article I, Section 10’s limited
abrogation of states’ authority to tax proved that the federal power created by
the Constitution could diminish states’ authority to tax in other cases as
well. 281

275.

Maryland argued that while a national bank might be necessary, a single branch in Washington, D.C., could coin money and lend it to the government in times of need, and that the
government could establish other branches in states that welcomed those branches. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 350 (argument of Mr. Hopkinson).
276. Id. at 373-74 (argument of Mr. Martin).
277.

Chief Justice Marshall caricatured the strict-construction argument by saying that Maryland’s reading of the word “necessary” would prevent the government from deriving an implied power to carry the mail or prosecute mail theft from the enumerated power to establish post oﬃces. Id. at 417 (Marshall, C.J.). In fact, the argument was much less extreme.

278.

Id. at 343 (argument of Mr. Hopkinson).
279. Id. at 366, 369 (argument of Mr. Jones) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
280.
281.

Id. at 376 (argument of Mr. Martin).
Id. at 425 (Marshall, C.J.).
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The carelessness of these responses seems to underscore that Marshall’s
priority was not the Bank or Maryland’s tax, but rather the overarching character of the Constitution. What Marshall set out to accomplish in McCulloch v.
Maryland was a strong defense of a public-law interpretation of the Constitution. He began by rejecting the view that the union had been formed by agreement among the states. During the ratiﬁcation process, he said, “the instrument was submitted to the people” and “[f]rom these Conventions the
constitution derives its whole authority.” 282 At the Conventions, “the people
were at perfect liberty to accept or reject” the Constitution, and “their act was
ﬁnal.” 283 The Constitution therefore “required not the aﬃrmance, and could
not be negatived, by the State governments.” 284 From this origin story, he described the government’s essential “nature”: “It is the government of all; its
powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all.” 285 The “necessar[y]” “result” of this essential nature was that this government “is supreme
within its sphere of action.” 286
Here, Marshall signaled that his argument, like those of the government’s
attorneys, did not rely on the Constitution’s text. Instead, the supremacy of the
federal government ﬂowed directly from its origin and “nature.” That is why
his next move was to overread and modify Article VI. Article VI demonstrated
the supremacy of the federal government, he said, “by requiring that the members of the State legislatures, and the oﬃcers of the executive and judicial departments of the States, shall take the oath of ﬁdelity” to the Constitution.287
He then paraphrased the Supremacy Clause to provide that “[t]he government
of the United States . . . though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws,
when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land,
‘any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’” 288 This is, of course, not what the Constitution says. Only the laws made
pursuant to the Constitution are supreme, not the government that makes
them. And the required oath proves nothing, as Article VI requires both federal
and state oﬃcials to swear allegiance to the Constitution. 289 It is a subtle point,

282.
283.

Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
Id. at 404.

284.

Id.
285. Id. at 405.
286.

Id.
287. Id. at 406.
288.
289.

Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 3.
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but absolutely critical in McCulloch, where the issue was which of two rights
arguably derived from the Constitution should take priority.
Taking the speciﬁc limitations on the state taxing power in Article I, Section
10 together with the reservation of all other powers in the Tenth Amendment,
Maryland’s right to tax had better grounding in the Constitution’s text. Marshall’s modiﬁcation of the Supremacy Clause to invent a hierarchy of governments with the federal government on top was therefore critical to his resolution of the case. In this way, Marshall used the Constitution’s origin story to
derive a priority principle that was not in the text—indeed, one that the Tenth
Amendment arguably refuted.
Marshall could make this kind of argument—a judgment in spite of the
text—because his account of the Constitution’s origin and nature prescribed an
equitable interpretation. This characterization transformed the federal government from one that held no powers except those enumerated into a colossus
that held all powers except those forbidden. Because the Tenth Amendment did
not include the word “expressly,” Marshall reasoned that it left “the question,
whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has
been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on
a fair construction of the whole instrument.” 290 He insisted that the Framers
intentionally “omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation.” 291 “[T]here is no phrase in the instrument,” Marshall argued, which “excludes incidental or implied powers; and
which requires that every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described.” 292 Marshall’s reading created a strange effect: it made the absence of
some words more meaningful than the presence of others.
The Constitution’s “subject,” Marshall said, was “the execution of those
great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends.”293 And because such a law could only be a public act, its legislative history was immaterial. 294 Chief Justice Marshall could therefore brush aside arguments that cited
state-ratiﬁcation debates on the issue of taxation and the Federalist Papers on the
same subject. He did not need to mention the diﬃcult fact that the Constitutional Convention debated and decided against giving Congress the power to
establish corporations. As with any public act, the actual intent of the legislators was irrelevant; idealized intent was all that mattered. For a law with public
290.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.

291.

Id. at 407.
292. Id. at 406.
293.
294.

Id. at 415.
See supra Section I.C.
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welfare as its object, that “intention” “must have been,” Marshall argued, “to
insure, as far as human prudence could insure, [its] beneﬁcial execution.”295
And like other public acts, it should therefore be read ﬂexibly, to “accommodate” unforeseen “circumstances.” 296 The Constitution was “intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 297 It must authorize implied as well as enumerated powers, he argued, because “[t]o have prescribed the means by which government should,
in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the
character of the instrument.” 298
When Marshall urged that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding,” he was defending his choice of methodology in terms that
would have been unmistakable to his contemporary audience. As the ultimate
public law, a constitution demanded a broad, purpose-directed interpretation.
Unlike civil-law jurisdictions, which might promulgate their public laws in a
“prolix[]” “legal code,” American legislatures relied on courts to interpret a
smaller body of public legislation equitably and with the beneﬁt of a vast fund
of common-law precedent. 299 That is why the Constitution was (he argued)
framed in such general terms. The Constitution’s character as public-law meant
that the text itself was less important to interpretation than its general purposes. It also meant that words could be added or discounted if the text seemed
out of step with the law’s purposes. To be sure, Marshall had other arguments
for his position on the bank controversy. But none was as central. And all of his

295.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415.

296.

Id. at 415-16.
297. Id. at 415.
298.

Id.
299. Id. at 407. Chief Justice Marshall here references a nice turn of phrase from one of the arguments of counsel, who had urged that the Constitution was not designed to be as detailed as
a “code of private jurisprudence.” Id. at 357 (argument of Mr. Wirt). An 1885 treatise deﬁned
“private jurisprudence” as the law pertaining to persons, places, or actions, including rights
of “dominium” and “obligationes.” JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: ESPECIALLY DESIGNED FOR STUDENTS, GENERAL
AND PROFESSIONAL 383 (n.p., 8th ed. 1885). A source closer to Marshall’s time suggested “the
common law” as a synonym for the “private jurisprudence” of a nation. Writers on the Conﬂict of Laws, or Private International Law, 6 LAW REV. & Q.J. BRIT. & FOREIGN JURIS. 56, 73
(1847). So, “a code of private jurisprudence” would have meant the codiﬁcation of common
law rules, along the lines of what France attempted with the Code Napoléon. What Marshall
meant by distinguishing the Constitution from a “code” was not, therefore, the distinction I
am drawing in this Article between public and private legislation. “Private jurisprudence”
seems to have been a term of art, and its codiﬁcation was something that no British or British-derived common law jurisdiction had yet attempted.
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arguments on the constitutionality of the Bank ultimately depended on the
premise that the Constitution must be read as if it were a public law.
Marshall’s commitment to public-law principles of interpretation is underappreciated in part because of the disproportionate importance now assigned to a quote of his that seems in line with modern textualism. In Sturges v.
Crowinshield, a case decided in that same blockbuster 1819 term, the Court considered whether the Contract Clause restricted state-insolvency laws.300 Marshall rejected the state’s appeals to the “spirit” of the Constitution, arguing that
“[i]t would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances,
that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.” 301 Only in extraordinary situations, he said, should
the “plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in
the same instrument . . . be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that
instrument could not intend what they say.” 302 All this proves, however, is that
Marshall was not immune to the charms of using his states’ rights adversaries’
own logic to defeat them.
Sturges’s broad reading of the Contract Clause must be placed alongside
Marshall’s reading of the same text in Dartmouth College, decided that same
term. There, he used the tools of public-law interpretation to reject another
states’ rights interpretation of the Contract Clause. He refused to accept a narrowing interpretation just because “this particular case was not in the mind of
the Convention, when the article was framed, nor of the American people,
when it was adopted.” 303 The expectations of the actual legislators were unimportant, he urged. Instead, “[i]t is necessary to go farther, and to say that, had
this particular case been suggested, the language would have been so varied, as
to exclude it, or it would have been made a special exception.” 304 In other
words, he imagined an idealized legislature and then supplied the answers that
legislature would have given. The Dartmouth College ruling is not as incompatible with modern textualism as some of his other jurisprudence. But it is also in
line with the principles of public-act interpretation, and consistent with the
other cases of that term, including McCulloch. What is inconsistent with modern textualism is that Marshall almost always reached for these text-oriented
tools to broaden the Constitution’s meaning. When did Marshall ever ﬁnd that
the text of the Constitution constrained his discretion?
300.

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).

301.

Id. at 202.
302. Id. at 202-03.
303.
304.

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 644 (1819).
Id.
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Marshall failed to convince his critics. His McCulloch opinion came under
furious attack in essays published anonymously in a major Republican newspaper. Again, the issue was not the Bank. One of Marshall’s anonymous critics,
Virginia’s Judge William Brockenbrough, said he was “willing to acquiesce in”
the existence of the Bank itself. He objected to “the principles which brought it
into life in the year 1791, and those by which it is supported now by the supreme court.” 305
The ﬁrst of these “dangerous” principles was the denial “that the powers of
the federal government [were] . . . delegated by the states.” 306 Brockenbrough
gave a point-by-point counterargument marshalling evidence of the states’ involvement in the ratiﬁcation of the Constitution. Even had an overwhelming
majority of the whole people assented to the Constitution, he said, it still
would not have bound the people of tiny Rhode Island had they not voted, as a
state, to ratify it. And he pointed out that the Constitution could be amended
only by recourse to state legislatures. “[T]his doctrine, which denies that the
states are parties to the federal compact, was pressed with great zeal” during
the Adams administration, when “the Congress . . . by the force of implication
passed a sedition law, and vested the President with arbitrary and despotic
powers.” 307 But the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had “exposed and refuted” that “doctrine” and he “did not expect that it would be brought forward at
this day under the supposed sanction of the highest judicial authority.” 308
Brockenbrough also renewed Virginia’s objection to the idea that the Constitution had made the Supreme Court the arbiter of contests between state and
federal power. Because Maryland’s lawyers in McCulloch had not questioned
the Court’s jurisdiction, Marshall could begin his McCulloch opinion with a
grandiose, unsupported statement of his own jurisdiction. Marshall’s ﬁrst paragraph aﬃrmed that a “decision” assigning “the conﬂicting powers of the Government of the Union and of its members” could “be made” “by this tribunal
alone,” because “[o]n the Supreme Court of the United States has the Constitution of our country devolved this important duty.” 309 Judge Brockenbrough
found this idea laughable. He cited state-court decisions refuting the position,
305.

Amphictyon, Letter to the Editor, On the Opinion of the Supreme Court . . . . No. 2, RICH. ENQUIRER, Apr. 2, 1819, at 3 [hereinafter Amphictyon, No. 2]; see Eric Tscheschlock, Mistaken
Identity: Spencer Roane and the “Amphictyon” Letters of 1819, 106 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
201, 211 (1998) (identifying Brockenbrough as likely Amphictyon).
306. Amphictyon, Letter to the Editor, On the Opinion of the Supreme Court . . . . No. 1, RICH. ENQUIRER, Mar. 30, 1819, at 3 [hereinafter Amphictyon, No. 1].
307. Id.
308.
309.

Id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819).
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including Virginia’s Hunter v. Martin and a Pennsylvania case, Respublica v.
Cobbett. 310 He also “humbly” pointed out what he saw as its basic illogic:
“[T]he states never could have committed an act of such egregious folly as to
agree that their umpire should be altogether appointed and paid by the other
party.” 311 In his own series of anonymous essays attacking McCulloch, Virginia’s
Judge Spencer Roane agreed. He urged that the “court had no power to adjudicate away the reserved rights of a sovereign member of the confederacy, and vest
them in the general government.” 312 While “[t]he power of the supreme court
is indeed great . . . it does not extend to every thing; it is not great enough to
change the constitution.” 313
The essays also took on what they saw as a “second” dangerous “principle”:
“that the grant of powers to [the federal] government . . . ought to be construed in a liberal, rather than a restricted sense.” 314 Roane dismissed Marshall’s
carefully constructed distinction between ends speciﬁcally enumerated in the
Constitution and the implied means used to effectuate them. “That man must
be a deplorable idiot, who does not see that there is no earthly difference between an unlimited grant of power, and a grant limited in its terms, but accompanied with unlimited means of carrying it into execution.” 315 Marshall’s reading of the words “necessary and proper” as “appropriate, conducive to,” or
“convenient,” had “in effect, expunged those words from the constitution” because there was “no essential difference between” erasing the words “and reading them in a sense entirely arbitrary.” 316 This was unacceptable, said Judge
Roane. “Great as is the conﬁdence of the nation in all its tribunals, they are not
at liberty to change the meaning of our language.” 317 And the alarming consequence of this liberal construction was to extend a “general power of attorney
to congress.” 318

310.

Amphictyon, No. 1, supra note 306, at 3 (ﬁrst citing Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1
(1814), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); and then citing Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (Pa. 1798)).

311.

Id.
312. Hampden, Letter to the Editor, Rights of “The States,” and of “The People,” No. 1, RICH. ENQUIRER, June 11, 1819, at 3; see Tscheschlock, supra note 305, at 211 (identifying Hampden as
Roane).
313.

Hampden, supra note 312, at 3.
314. Amphictyon, No. 1, supra note 306, at 3.
315.

Hampden, supra note 312, at 3.
316. Id.
317.
318.

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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The essayists also argued that these dangerous principles were pure dicta:
neither a decision about the nation’s origin nor one about the principles of construction applicable to the Constitution had been necessary to the resolution of
the case. Therefore, the opinion was “extra-judicial” and “not more binding or
obligatory than the opinion of any other six intelligent members of the community.” 319 Given all of McCulloch’s ﬂaws, the essayists “trust[ed] that neither
the Congress, nor the President, will consider themselves bound by that decision in any future case, but will pursue the true meaning of the constitution,
and not usurp powers never granted to them.” 320
Marshall conﬁded in Story that he feared the impact of this criticism. If
successful, the private-law analogy would “convert[]” “the constitution . . . into
the old confederation.” 321 That anxiety prompted Marshall to write his own responsive essays and to publish them under a pseudonym in the newspapers.
These anonymous essays in defense of McCulloch said little that was new, but
they said it in a furious tone. At points, Marshall even descended to ad hominem attacks on his critics. 322 This was not the reaction of a Chief Justice who
had, in the words of the typical modern constitutional law casebook, established
the principles asserted in the Court’s Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee and McCulloch v.
Maryland opinions. It more closely resembles the ﬂailing of a person who sees
his philosophy in decline.
D. The Court in Retreat: Cohens v. Virginia
The assertiveness of Martin and McCulloch was short lived. By the 1820s,
the debate over federal authority began its long shift from legalistic wrangling
319.
320.

Amphictyon, No. 1, supra note 306, at 3.
Amphictyon, No. 2, supra note 305, at 2.

321.

Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (May 27, 1819), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 313, 314 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1995).

322.

Marshall accused Amphictyon of trying to impose his views on a gullible and excitable public for political gain: “The decision of the Supreme Court . . . has been seized as a fair occasion for once more agitating the publick mind, and reviving those unfounded jealousies by
whose blind aid ambition climbs the ladder of power.” John Marshall, A Friend to the Union,
PHILA. UNION (Apr. 24-28, 1819), reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND 78, 78 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). He made the same accusation when responding to Hampden’s criticisms, which he also smeared as a “ranting declamation,” saying,
“[w]hy has Hampden attempted thus plainly to pervert this opinion, and to ascribe to it
doctrines which it clearly rejects? He knows well that prejudices once impressed on the public mind, are not easily removed; and that the progress of truth and reason is slow.” John
Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE (June 30-July 15, 1819), reprinted
in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND , supra, at 155, 157, 186.
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to the bitter political dispute that would eventually ignite the Civil War. Marshall’s deep concern, and the real vulnerability of his position, was on display in
his opinion in Cohens v. Virginia. The case should have been straightforward:
Congress authorized the Cohen brothers to operate a lottery in Washington,
D.C. When they sold tickets in Virginia, they were arrested and convicted of
violating state law. Under the rule established in McCulloch v. Maryland, the defendants should have won. It was undisputed that Congress had the right to
“exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” 323 in Washington, D.C.,
and this included the power to create a lottery. To restrict the sales of lottery
tickets to D.C. would render Congress’s power less effective. Under McCulloch,
therefore, Congress’s power to legislate for D.C. implied a power to protect that
legislation from state interference, and Virginia could not restrict the sale of
tickets. But Virginia refused even to engage with the McCulloch precedent or
the merits of the case. The state sent its lawyers to the Supreme Court with instructions to restrict their arguments to the issue ostensibly settled ﬁve years
earlier in Martin: they insisted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from state-court decisions. “[I]f the jurisdiction of the Court should be
sustained,” they were instructed to “consider their duties as at an end.” 324
Virginia’s audacity put Marshall on the defensive. He keenly felt just how
precarious his position had become. In a prescient passage, Marshall lamented
how the Virginians “maintain that the nation does not possess a department
capable of restraining peaceably, and by authority of law, any attempts which
may be made, by a part, against the legitimate powers of the whole.” 325 This
meant “that the government is reduced to the alternative of submitting to such
attempts, or of resisting them by force.” 326 Not daring to lecture Virginia on its
obligation to follow Martin and McCulloch, he tried an appeal to reason. Was
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts “unreasonable”?
Marshall “th[ought] not”:
We think that in a government acknowledgedly supreme, with respect
to objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing inconsistent
with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of government, in making all its departments supreme, so far as respects those
objects, and so far as is necessary to their attainment. 327
323.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.

324.

Constitutional Question, 19 NILES’ WKLY. REG., Feb. 24, 1821, at 417.
325. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821).
326.
327.

Id.
Id. at 414-15.
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Marshall felt less conﬁdent in asserting a broad, purpose-directed reading
of the text. He did not bother to repeat the trick of reading the supremacy of
the federal government into the Supremacy Clause, as he had in McCulloch, instead relying on the support of the feeble adverb “acknowledgedly.” And in a
sign that the attack on his public-act analogy had gotten under his skin, Marshall turned the tables on his critics. He insisted that it was the Virginians who
were interpreting the Constitution according to their view of its “spirit” while
Marshall hewed to its “words.” 328 Marshall then strained to ﬁnd a reading of
the state and federal statutes that would allow him to avoid either striking
down Virginia’s statute or reversing the decision of a Virginia court. As in Marbury, Marshall stated his principles while practicing a form of realpolitik to
avoid acknowledging that the Court was powerless to impose its ruling. 329
Marshall did not win the battle over the Constitution’s characterization, at
least not during his lifetime or for the generation that followed. Recalcitrant
states saw the Court’s weakness and exploited it. Marshall’s “great” opinions
came to stand as evidence of the weakness of Marshall’s position, the incapacity
of the Court, and the validity of alternative interpretations of the Constitution.
After the Court handed down McCulloch, the State of Ohio refused to repeal
the punitive tax law it had enacted to drive the Bank of the United States out of
the state. A committee of Ohio’s legislature published a legal opinion defending
the decision, explaining that it was “not . . . either in theory or in practice, the
necessary consequence of a decision of the Supreme Court, that all who claim
rights of the same nature with those decided by the court are required to acquiesce.” 330 As proof, the committee cited “cases in which the decisions of that tribunal have been followed by no effective consequence.” 331 These included Marbury v. Madison, in which the Court had decided that Marbury was entitled to
his commission. But “Mr. Marbury never did obtain his commission; the person appointed in his place continued to act; his acts were admitted to be valid;
and President Jefferson retained his standing in the estimation of the American
people.” 332 In that case, “[t]he decision of the Supreme Court proved to be to-

328.
329.

Id. at 422.
See Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic
Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67 (1995) (interpreting Cohens along
these lines).

330.

Right of a State to Tax a Branch of the United States Bank, 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1684, 1697
(1821).

331.

Id.
Id.

332.
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tally impotent and unavailing.” 333 The same was true of the Court’s decision in
Fletcher v. Peck, where the decision “availed” the winners “nothing, unless as a
make-weight in effecting a compromise.” 334
The State of Ohio took these cases as “evidence that, in great questions of
political rights and political powers, a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States is not conclusive of the rights decided by it.” 335 The bottom line
was, “[i]f the United States stand justiﬁed in withholding a commission when
the court adjudged it to be the party’s right,” and if, in other cases, the Supreme
Court’s decision was merely one step along the way to an eventual political resolution, “surely the State of Ohio ought not to be condemned because she did
not abandon her solemn legislative acts as a dead letter upon the promulgation
of an opinion of that tribunal.” 336
Over time, some of the principles Virginia had championed gained adherents. In 1832, Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill reauthorizing the Bank of the United States. His veto message repudiated Marshall’s grandiose claim, set out in
the ﬁrst paragraph of his McCulloch opinion, that the Constitution made the
Supreme Court the ﬁnal authority on constitutional questions. Jackson insisted
to the contrary that “[e]ach public oﬃcer who takes an oath to support the
Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others.” 337 Nothing the Court had said could convince Jackson
that the bank was constitutional or alter his understanding of his resulting duty. This view of his oath aligned Jackson with Virginia’s explanation of the Supremacy Clause in Hunter v. Martin. Jackson was no advocate of state nulliﬁcation—he subscribed to no principle that undermined his own power—but his
understanding of the Constitution brought him closer to Virginia than to Marshall.
If Marshall’s public-act analogy failed, however, it is not because the private-act analogy triumphed. By the end of the 1820s, the position articulated by
Thomas Jefferson in 1798 and Spencer Roane in 1814 had become antique. The
conversation about federal authority had shifted away from principles of construction and taken on new, more dangerous terms. All along the way, lawyers
and judges had hinted at the possibility that disagreements over the Constitu-

333.

Id.

334.

Id.
Id.

335.
336.
337.

Id.
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Oﬃce
1896).
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tion might result in a serious political break. These cases risked “a conﬂict between the national and state authorities that may ultimately involve both in one
common ruin,” said one of the lawyers in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee. 338 “The taper of judicial discord may become the torch of civil war, and though the breath
of a judge can extinguish the ﬁrst, the wisdom of the statesman may not
quench the latter.” 339 Marshall made the same point in McCulloch, warning that
the questions presented “must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation,” and “perhaps of hostility of a still more serious nature.” 340
McCulloch’s critics in Virginia responded with the meager reassurance that Virginia would never use “force to support her doctrines, till other measures have
entirely failed.” 341
By 1829, some believed that moment had come. After Congress imposed
tariffs that particularly hurt Southern economic interests, South Carolina denied the law’s validity in an essay and series of resolutions that looked back to
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions for precedent. This “Exposition and
Protest,” written by John C. Calhoun, reasserted the compact theory of the nation’s origins. But instead of continuing on to make the familiar argument for
private-act principles of interpretation, the essay took another turn. Calhoun
urged that the ﬁght over principles of construction was over. The attempt to
promote “a rigid rule of construction,” while laudable, had failed. 342 Instead,
the “decisive proof of our own short experience” had been that “[i]f the minority has a right to select its rule of construction, a majority will exercise the same,
but with this striking difference, that the power of the former will be a mere
nullity, against that of the latter.” 343 Calhoun admitted the “importance” of “a
proper system of construction.” 344 But he thought it had become “perfectly
clear that no system of the kind, however perfect, can prescribe bounds to the
encroachment of power.” 345 The arena of conﬂict, he insisted, must shift, and
the friends of state prerogative must now admit the truth: “that power can only
be met with power.” 346
338.
339.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 320 (1816).
Id.

340.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819).
341. Amphictyon, No. 2, supra note 305, at 3.
342.

Special Comm. of House of Representatives of S.C., Exposition and Protest on the Tariff 29
(Columbia, S.C., D.W. Sims 1829).

343.

Id.
344. Id.
345.
346.

Id.
Id.
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iv. scholarly and practic al implic ations
A. Statutory Interpretation
When legal scholars have attended to the fascinating history of statutory
interpretation, an overemphasis on current jurisprudential and political debates
has sometimes clouded their vision. In a previous generation, legal-process
scholars rediscovered the early American tradition of equitable interpretation
and promoted it as an example of how purpose-driven interpretation could
work within the American constitutional framework.347 As I have explored in
some detail elsewhere, these scholars missed important practical and constitutional differences between the America of the early-nineteenth century and the
America of the twentieth. 348 That said, the lessons the legal-process scholars
drew were much more direct, and their analysis of early America much more
dexterous, than the efforts of those scholars and judges who now try to ally
originalism with textualism in statutory interpretation.
Professor William N. Eskridge broke this ground ﬁrst, when he rediscovered the use of equitable interpretation in the post-ratiﬁcation decades and held
it up as a challenge to Justice Scalia’s dual legacy of originalism and textualism. 349 Professor John Manning, a leading disciple of that legacy, took up the
challenge. Manning argued that the Founders were indeed textualists and that
equitable interpretation was merely “a doctrinal artifact of an ancient English
governmental structure, one that had blended governmental powers,” and one
that had not “translate[d] well into a U.S. Constitution marked by separated
powers.” 350 After examining the “relatively few federal statutory cases . . . [in]
the early volumes of case reports,” he thought it “safe to say that the equity of
the statute never gained a secure foothold.” 351 Eskridge then published a rejoinder, which read a wider range of early American legal sources, including the
ratiﬁcation debates and Chief Justice Marshall’s jurisprudence, to argue that

347.

See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 214-18 (1934).
348. See Peterson, supra note 20, at 715.
349.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1523-25
(1998).

350.

Manning, supra note 20, at 8.
Id. at 9.

351.
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Founding-era interpretive methods were more diverse than textualists would
like to admit. 352
Eskridge was right to call textualism’s historical bona ﬁdes into question,
and he would have been right even if he had found no evidence of equitable interpretation in the federal courts. One problem, not limited to investigations of
early methods of statutory interpretation, is that scholars often look for their
evidence of early American legal practice in the wrong places. The federal
courts were specialty institutions, like a court of claims or an admiralty court
would be today. Scholars who think of the federal courts as a sort of archetypal
court might be misled into trying to use them to learn about early American jurisprudence. But federal courts had very limited jurisdiction, and what jurisdiction they had was so freighted with nonlegal pressure that their decisions cannot properly be understood without reference to their political context.
Under the ﬁrst Judiciary Act, federal courts could hear only cases in admiralty and cases dealing with citizens of different states, penalties and forfeitures
under the laws of the United States, and the small number of federal crimes.353
There was no “federal question” jurisdiction. An 1801 act both increased the
number of federal judges and expanded their jurisdiction,354 but outgoing Federalists used that act to pack the courts with their own appointees. The federal
courts were thereby thrust into party politics and conﬁrmed as dangerous havens for a partisan philosophy that quickly waned in inﬂuence. The Jeffersonians repealed the 1801 Act in 1802, and the federal courts’ jurisdiction shrank
again. 355 Federal courts subsequently gained jurisdiction only to play highly
unpopular and politically dangerous roles. For example, they received jurisdiction under a temporary provision after the War of 1812 so that federal customs

352.

Eskridge, supra note 20, at 995-98; see also Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1253 (2002) (“It is not surprising that Professors Manning and Eskridge would examine the founding materials for evidence of whether the
Founders expected judges to serve as subordinates to the legislature or as members of a coordinate branch of government.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 910 (2003) (describing the debate between Manning and
Eskridge as “a ﬁght that can end only in stalemate”). But see Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 313, 317 n.21 (2014) (writing of the Manning and Eskridge debate: “The most prominent constitutional debate in statutory interpretation has centered around the nature of the ‘judicial power,’ an approach which I reject here,
as incapable of either resolving the question or of asking the correct question.”).

353.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 13, 1 Stat. 73, 76-81.
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, §§ 7, 11, 2 Stat. 89, 90-92 (providing for circuit judgeships and
deﬁning circuit-court jurisdiction) (repealed 1802).
355. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, §§ 1-2, 2 Stat. 132, 132.
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collectors could remove their enforcement actions from state courts.356 They
also gained jurisdiction under the 1832 Force Bill in order to allow for suits to
enforce tariffs on secessionists in South Carolina.357 Again, they received jurisdiction under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act to enforce slave owners’ property
rights in the North. 358 In other words, lower federal courts often served as outposts of the federal government, which was frequently resented as a foreign
and unwelcome intruder in state affairs. At other times, they served as mediators for states with opposing interests. These roles often made Article III courts
fora for something better described as diplomacy than law.
Therefore, a scholar trying to learn about historical legal practice using only
the federal reporter has given himself an unduly narrowed and idiosyncratic
focus. If we want to ﬁnd out about jurisprudence in early America, we have to
study the states. Only there can we see the interpretive conventions of this period applied in ordinary cases and by courts of general jurisdiction, and begin
to draw conclusions about trends and traditions in early American law. Statecourt jurisprudence provides the best evidence of the legal principles judges
and lawyers brought into debates over federal law.
An anachronistic focus on the federal courts has also meant that scholars
tend to look at the wrong people. A conceit of some originalist methods, including corpus linguistics and other investigations of public meaning, is a
charming but misplaced democratic style of engagement with the materials.
Some scholars seem to view the legal world of the past, because it is old, as
though it were ﬂat, and as though any explanation or argument one can glean
from that past has equal value. But to men of the time, it was very obvious that
legal talents were not equally distributed. Certain men, including Kent of New
York, Ruﬃn of North Carolina, DeSaussure of South Carolina, Roane of Virginia, Parker of Massachusetts, Smith of New Hampshire, Swift of Connecticut, and Brackenridge of Pennsylvania, along with a handful of others, distinguished themselves and had a disproportionate inﬂuence over their peers and
over the direction of the law. 359

356.

Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, §§ 6, 8, 3 Stat. 231, 233-35 (providing for the Act to last for a
year); Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, §§ 8, 13, 3 Stat. 195, 198-99 (providing for the Act to last
until the end of the War).

357.

Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, §§ 1-3, 4 Stat. 632, 632-34.
Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1, 5-7, 9 Stat. 462, 462-64 (repealed 1864).

358.
359.

See Peterson, supra note 20, at 719-20. I obviously disagree with Willard Hurst’s assertion
that “on the bench, Marshall alone” exerted “individual inﬂuence” over the direction of legal
change. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 17-18
(1950).
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These men were not Article III judges and they were not on the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court’s obscurity and its initial lack of inﬂuence is one of
the reasons it was so hard to get qualiﬁed men to stay in the job. 360 It is why
the Court had to staff up with abrasive and mockable characters like Samuel
Chase. 361 And it is also the only reason that John Marshall, Adams’s second
choice and a controversial pick for the job even within his own party, was able
to secure the nomination for Chief Justice. 362 As Chief Justice, Marshall battled
for inﬂuence over the direction of American law. This Article has argued—and
more work could be done on this issue—that the Supreme Court of Virginia in
the early nineteenth century must be understood as a competitor jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court of Chief Justice Marshall, not a subordinate. If we want to
describe the jurisprudence of early America in terms that early American judges
and lawyers would recognize as accurate, we have to cite the men that they
would have seen as the relevant thought leaders—the men they would have cited. Those are state-court judges.
Finally, it is critical that those who would ally textualism with originalism
appreciate that jurisprudence, along with American theories on government,
changed. Professor Manning was conﬁdent he had found proof of textualism at
the Founding even though the pre-nineteenth-century evidence was inconclusive because he found that after 1800, John Marshall used methods of statutory
interpretation that look like textualism. 363 But Marshall’s jurisprudence was idiosyncratic. Marshall the lawyer was a product of the Founding era, certainly.
That is why he reached for the familiar interpretive paradigms this Article has
described to address the novel challenge of a written Federal Constitution. But
Marshall’s work can hardly tell us what “the Founders” thought about how

360.

President Adams nominated John Marshall only after “Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth had
resigned from the Supreme Court, and John Jay, the former chief justice, had declined a new
appointment.” John Marshall: Appointment as Chief Justice in 1801, in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, pt. 1, at 148, 151 (Maeva Marcus, James R. Perry, James M. Buchanan, Christine R. Jordan, Stephen L. Tull, Sandra F. VanBurkleo, Sarah E. Blank, Nancy L. Matthews & Marc Pachter eds., 1985).

361.

President Washington was “wary about nominating” Chase and offered him the seat only
after he “had trouble ﬁlling a vacancy on the Supreme Court.” This “was an unpopular
choice, even with the Federalists, and the Senate, uneasy about Chase’s cantankerous nature,
only reluctantly conﬁrmed his appointment.” Another federal judge later admitted that he
“never sat with [Chase] without pain, as he was forever getting into some intemperate and
unnecessary squabble.” See ELLIS, supra note 212, at 76-77, 82.

362.

See THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800
supra note 360, pt. 2, at 918-28 (relaying letters discussing the appointment of John Marshall, rather than William Paterson, for the Chief Justice position after John Jay rejected it).
363. See Manning, supra note 20, at 89-91.
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statutes or the Constitution should be read. Rather, Marshall is important because, as a proliﬁc member of that lawyerly generation, he helps us to understand how they thought about those questions.
Marshall took oﬃce just as some Founding-era expectations were upended
in ways that forced inﬂuential men to change their ideas about constitutional
government. Among other developments, the Founders failed to anticipate the
politics that brought Jefferson into the presidency. John Marshall was a savvy
political actor who was able to build his Court’s stature because he was adaptive, not because he hewed to the ideas of ten, twenty, and thirty years earlier.
His sensitivity when dealing with federal statutes was his way of managing the
relationship between his Court and a hostile Congress. And that is why looking
primarily to the federal courts and the Marshall Court to ﬁnd out how statutes
were interpreted in early America has tended to obscure distinctions like the
one outlined in Part I of this Article.
In fact, early Americans were neither textualists nor always purposivists—
they were both, as the situation demanded. One key insight of this Article is
that it is not helpful to look for ideologies of statutory interpretation in early
America. That is so even though it is possible to ﬁnd differences in approach
and arguments among judges about how statutes should be interpreted in individual cases. Marshall asserted that “no difference of opinion can exist” on
principles of interpretation even as he forged a new, idiosyncratic interpretive
style of statutory interpretation. 364 We can understand all of these facts together only when we understand that for judges of the time, the watchword of statutory interpretation was function, not dogma.
And the function of statutory interpretation in early America was to help
the legislature govern in the public welfare. Judges saw themselves as their legislatures’ helpmeet. 365 Marshall’s jurisprudence of interpretation looks strange
for his time in part because his partner legislature was an unusually vigilant institution for the era, and it did not welcome as much assistance. The same was
not true of most state legislatures, which were generally, if not invariably, lowcapacity institutions. 366
Judges’ general approach to interpretation, as Part I outlined, was ﬁrst to
discern the degree of intervention in the background law the statute had intended to effectuate. The question about whether a law was public or private
was also a question about whether it was meant to add power to or take power
out of the public weal; to regulate for the public or distribute a special privi364.

United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358, 386 (1805).

365.

See Peterson, supra note 20, at 723-24.
See id. (describing judicial impressions of legislative incompetence).

366.
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lege; to expend a renewable public resource or to bargain a ﬁnite property or
power away. Early American jurisprudence of interpretation aimed to interpret
laws in the manner that most beneﬁted, and least harmed, public welfare.
Judges saw themselves as part of the government and cases involving interpretation as part of the work of governance. 367 To see their work as they did requires a substantial shift in perspective. Their approach is a far cry from the
arm’s-length relationship between judiciary and legislature one ﬁnds today in
statutory-interpretation cases, in which judges see their role as either the legislature’s faithful agent or reluctant disciplinarian. 368
A modern judge who wants to pattern her jurisprudence on the past might
well come away from this Article with the simple insight that the Founders
would have interpreted today’s generally applicable legislation broadly and
ﬂexibly to effectuate its purposes. 369 When dealing with public laws, the leading judges of early America would have eschewed a narrow focus on the text
and would have felt free to read in new words or subtract erroneous ones when
necessary to make a statute work. And they believed that part of their role was
to help determine what it meant for a statute to “work,” relying on their expertise in the background law and their sense of what public needs the statute
might answer. 370
The modern judge could, however, glean a more fundamental and perhaps
more valuable lesson from this heritage, if she took as a model early American
judges’ practical and constructive approach to statutory interpretation. Early
American judges embraced their inevitable role in legislative statecraft and seriously set about the business of advancing the public good. 371
B. Constitutional Interpretation
I did not embark on this project to probe the historical bona ﬁdes of modern interpretive approaches—still less to prescribe one of my own. But this Article’s ﬁndings have at least two potentially important implications for those
who think judges should bear Founding-era practices in mind.
The ﬁrst carries forward the methodological point just discussed in the
context of statutory interpretation. The ﬁndings in this Article support the
conclusions of other historians and scholars whose investigations of this same
367.

Id. at 717.

368.

See id. at 713.
369. See supra Section I.A.
370.
371.

Peterson, supra note 20, at 713.
See id. at 735-36.
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period have challenged the idea that strict textualist constitutional interpretation predominated in the Founding era. They are in line with Jonathan Molot’s
observation that “[t]he Constitution’s proponents . . . did not view linguistic
indeterminacy or judicial leeway as a serious threat to popular rule or state sovereignty.” 372 And this Article builds on Saul Cornell’s work pointing out that
the ambiguity of language was a main concern for the opponents of the 1787
Constitution. 373 The Federal Constitution was not ratiﬁed because it was explicit on all points or because its text could answer all the questions it was
meant to address. It was ratiﬁed because enough of its supporters trusted that
judges could elaborate on its text when necessary, just as they did with public
legislation.
Sanford Levinson and other contemporary scholars have argued that modern interpretations of the Constitution are inevitable in part because the inherent ambiguity of language means that a document can almost never have a determinate meaning. Because “all language is read against a background
of . . . shared understandings, purposes, and assumptions,” he argues, it is impossible for contemporary interpreters to avoid injecting their own values into
the text. 374 The Framers were alive to this conundrum. At least some of those
who voted to ratify the Constitution did so anyway because they trusted that
the principles applicable to public laws would provide courts the ﬂexibility to
resolve ambiguities and adapt as new circumstances arose. 375 Admitting that

372.

Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern
Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28 (2000); see also
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006) (“[T]he
Founders’ conﬂicting statements on the judicial role have helped to fuel the contemporary
debate over modern textualism.”). But see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 75 (2006) (describing Molot’s article as “thoughtful and
reﬂective,” but citing the Marshall era to push back on Molot’s arguments about the Founding era). As I discuss above the line, I would argue that Marshall’s jurisprudence is not good
evidence of “Founding-era” practice.

373.

Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism
and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 307-10 (2011).

374.

Sanford Levinson, What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do with Their Knowledge)?
Comments on Schauer and Moore, S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 449 (1985); see also White, Law as Language, supra note 23, at 417 (“[It is] absurd to speak as if the meaning of a text were always
simply there to be observed and demonstrated in some quasi-scientiﬁc way.”). See generally
WHITE, LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 23 (describing how legal rhetoric helps constitute
legal meaning).

375.

But not all, of course. The ratiﬁcation statements of several state conventions speciﬁed that
the state had ratiﬁed on the understanding that “clauses are to be construed” narrowly. See,
e.g., New York Declaration of Rights, Form of Ratiﬁcation, and Recommendatory Amendments to the Constitution, 26 July 1788, reprinted in 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
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language was imperfect and admitting that their vision was limited, these
Founders had conﬁdence in the Constitution’s durability not because they assumed that future generations would or could derive a ﬁxed and timeless
meaning from its words, but because they expected that judges would interpolate the text to govern the “unforeseen.” That is what public-act interpretation
was all about.
The second implication is institutional. The Supreme Court, through its jurisprudence, increasingly characterizes itself as the constrained minister of the
government, rather than a coequal participant in governance. In our time, the
alliance of originalism and textualism has grounded a limited view of the
Court’s obligation, or indeed its capacity, to guarantee the rights-conveying
provisions of the Federal Constitution. This Article suggests that historical
practice does not support such a cramped view of judicial power.
Consider the Court’s evolving approach to Bivens case law. To review: in
the complaint that initiated Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, Webster
Bivens alleged that federal agents had entered his home, searched it, and arrested him in front of his family without a warrant and without probable
cause. 376 Arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, he sued the
oﬃcers for damages. The district court dismissed his suit in part because he
failed to state a federal cause of action, as there was no federal statute creating a
damages remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment. 377 The Court of Appeals aﬃrmed on that ground. 378 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a federal oﬃcer’s violation of a person’s constitutional rights gives
rise to a cause of action for damages, with or without a federal statute authorizing suit. 379
In Bivens, the Supreme Court decided that federal courts do not have to
wait for Congress to act to fashion remedies for constitutional violations. This
holding was based on an analogy to the statutory-interpretation context. The
Court pointed out that it was “well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 2326, 2327 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino,
Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber, Margaret A. Hogan & Jonathan M. Reid eds.,
2009). Fascinatingly, these signing statements seem to have had little impact on the subsequent debate over proper interpretation.
376.

403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
377. Id. at 389-90.
378.
379.

Id. at 390.
See id.
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done.” 380 If courts could do this when federal statutes had been violated, the
majority implied, then they could also recognize an action to vindicate constitutional rights.
The majority then saw the Court as an institution capable of policy judgment and creativity in defense of constitutional rights. Chief Justice Burger’s
dissent argued that a “judicially create[d] . . . damage[s] remedy” did not serve
“the important values of the doctrine of separation of powers,” and he chided
the majority that “[l]egislation is the business of the Congress.” 381 But Justice
Harlan’s concurrence pushed back, making more explicit the connection between the Court’s statutory-interpretation powers and its conclusion about its
own constitutional powers. He argued that it didn’t make sense to say that “the
decision to grant compensatory relief involves a resolution of policy considerations not susceptible of judicial discernment,” when the Court felt free to read
damages remedies into statutes “where, in its view, damages are necessary to
effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of
the statute.” 382 And if the Court could add in a damages provision to vindicate a
legal interest created by statute, then “the fact that the interest is protected by
the Constitution rather than statute or common law” could not “justif[y] the
assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant damages in the absence of
explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy.” 383 In deciding which
remedy, monetary or equitable, was appropriate, Harlan urged that “the range
of policy considerations we may take into account is at least as broad as the
range . . . a legislature would consider.” 384 And he saw the sensible exercise of
this judicial authority as “important,” writing that in a “civilized society,” the
“judicial branch of the Nation’s government [must] stand ready to afford a
remedy” for “the most ﬂagrant and patently unjustiﬁed sorts of police conduct.” 385
Fifty years later, while Bivens has not been overruled, the logic of the Bivens
dissent is now the majority position. It may be not too much to say that as a result, our society is appreciably less “civilized.” In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Court

380.

Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).

381.

Id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (ﬁrst citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964); then citing Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S.
210, 213 (1944); and then comparing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,
201-04 (1967)).
383. Id. at 403.
382.

384.
385.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 411.
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refused to allow parents to sue a border-police oﬃcer responsible for aiming
across the U.S. border into Mexico and shooting their child, who had been either playing a game that involved running up to touch the border wall (the account of Mexican eyewitnesses who ﬁlmed the incident on their cell phones),
or throwing rocks (the oﬃcer’s account). 386
The Mesa Court explained that Bivens and the cases that expanded its holding to other oﬃcial misconduct “were the products of an era when the Court
routinely inferred ‘causes of action’ that were ‘not explicit’ in the text of the
provision that was allegedly violated.” 387 They came from a time in which “the
Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective a statute’s purpose,” and when, “as a routine
matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself.” 388 The majority in Mesa explained, however,
that “[i]n later years, we came to appreciate more fully the tension between this
practice and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power.”389
The Court’s view now is that “when a court recognizes an implied claim for
damages on the ground that doing so furthers the ‘purpose’ of a law, the court
risks arrogating legislative power.” 390 The Court made clear that a shift in
thought about how to interpret statutes has accompanied a shift in law about
constitutional interpretation. Now, said Justice Alito, writing for the majority,
“[i]n both statutory and constitutional cases, our watchword is caution.” 391
Further expansions of the Bivens holding are “disfavored.” 392 As Justice Thomas
put it in his concurrence, it was a “misguided approach to implied causes of action in the statutory context” that “formed the backdrop of the Court’s decision
in Bivens.” 393
For Justices Alito Thomas, early American views on these issues are important. And what this Article suggests is that the Bivens majority was more in
line with early American practice than was the dissent. There is more work to
be done on this issue, but there is evidence that the great judges of early America felt free to fashion remedies for public legislation when legislatures had

386.
387.

140 S. Ct. 735, 740-41 (2020).
Id. at 741 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)).

388.

Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
389. Id.
390.

Id.
391. Id. at 742.
392.
393.

Id. (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857).
Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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failed to provide them. 394 Gap-ﬁlling to make statutes work, to help statutes
fulﬁll their purposes, was the essence of equitable interpretation. And if we care
about how the great Chief Justice Marshall believed the Constitution should be
interpreted, as Justices Alito and Thomas frequently do, then it is hardly inappropriate to use a jurisprudence of purposive and gap-ﬁlling statutory interpretation as an analogy for judicial power to interpret the Constitution.
There may be reasons to seek out the original meaning of the Constitution’s
text or to proceed with caution when fashioning new remedies to effectuate its
purposes. But the Founding-era record cannot justify those choices on its
own. 395 Textualism and originalism are normative policy positions—or philosophical commitments—that must be seen for what they are and stand or fall
on their own terms. History cannot dictate textualism, when we know that
leading early American jurists routinely applied another method. Nor is it
enough to gesture at Founding-era practices to discern the substantive content
of the Bill of Rights, when we know that some proportion of the ratiﬁers and a
historically signiﬁcant cohort of the Constitution’s ﬁrst generation of interpreters thought the Constitution was a document whose meaning would be elaborated by judges as they encountered new circumstances that the Framers had
failed to anticipate. This was, as Chief Justice Marshall put it in McCulloch,
a constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed
the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been . . . an unwise attempt to provide . . . for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which
can be best provided for as they occur. 396
conclusion
There has been some interesting scholarship on modern “laws of interpretation”—both on the fact that they exist, and on the need to deﬁne them.397
394.

See Peterson, supra note 20, at 744 (describing Chancellor Kent’s articulation of a remedy for
plaintiffs in Erie Canal-related cases).
395. I should note that at least some people think that there is an originalist argument for Bivens.
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Institute for Justice in Support of Petitioners at 2, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678).
396.
397.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1084 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law”
and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1907-24 (2011); Helen Silving, A Plea for a Law of
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What this Article reveals is that Americans of the late-eighteenth century had a
law of interpretation and that its rules were widely understood. One of the unanticipated consequences of the decision to make the American Constitution
written law was that these well-understood and uncontroversial preratiﬁcation
rules of interpretation became freighted with politics.
The ﬁrst Americans experienced the shift to writtenness as a shift to lawyerly argumentation over hermeneutics. They also witnessed the ﬁrst selfconscious selection of interpretive methodologies to suit the range of outcomes
the interpreter preferred. Far from a symptom of modern politics or contemporary jurisprudence, disputes over interpretation have been a consistent feature
of the American system almost from the beginning.

Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 501 (1950); cf. Charles L. Barzun, Constructing Originalism or: Why Professors Baude and Sachs Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love Ronald
Dworkin, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 128, 131-32 (2019) (criticizing the “original-law originalism” law of interpretation advanced by Baude and Sachs).
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